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Recent Developments
BANKRUPTCY

-

DISCHARGE -

APPLIED TO SECTION

14c(4)
I.

ANALYSIS OF "ACTUAL INTENT" TEST AS
OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT.

INTRODUCTION

The determination of a bankrupt's right to a discharge from his
indebtedness is one of the final steps in the bankruptcy process.1 Under
section 14 of the Bankruptcy Act (Act),2 a discharge is automatically
granted unless, upon objection by one of the parties in interest,3 the court is
satisfied that the bankrupt has committed one of the enumerated acts
prohibited by section 14c. 4 Section 14c(4)1 specifically provides a ground for
denying a discharge if the bankrupt has "at any time subsequent to the first
day of the twelve months immediately preceding the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy, transferred, removed, destroyed, or concealed, any of his
'6
property with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors."
A showing of this "intent to hinder, delay, or defraud [a bankrupt's]
creditors" is essential for a section 14c(4) denial.7 In construing this phrase,
courts have required that "actual," as opposed to "constructive," intent on
1. A discharge operates to release the bankrupt from all of his provable debts,

whether fully or only partially allowable, except those debts specifically enumerated
in section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §35 (1970). Section 63 of the
Bankruptcy Act categorizes those debts which may be proved and allowed. 11 U.S.C.
§ 103 (1970).
2. Id. §32.
3. The parties in interest include the trustee, the creditors, and the United States
attorney. Bankruptcy Act § 14b(2), 11 U.S.C. § 32b(2) (1970). If no objection is filed by
the expiration of the time set for filing objections, the court must grant the bankrupt a
discharge. Id. If objections are filed, the court in which the proceedings are pending is
required to give the bankrupt and the objecting parties a reasonable opportunity to be
heard. Id.
4. Id. § 32c.
5. Id. § 32c(4).
6. Id. (emphasis added). At the present time, two versions of a proposed
Bankruptcy Act are being considered by Congress. See H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975); H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The first version was submitted by the
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States and the second was
submitted by the bankruptcy judges. See Countryman, A History of American
Bankruptcy Law, 81 COM. L. J. 226, 232 (1976). Although section 14c(4) would remain
basically unaltered under both proposed acts, the scope of its coverage would be
slightly expanded. First, action by the bankrupt "with respect to any property of the
estate after the date of the petition" would be brought within the provision. H.R. 31,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-505(a)(1) (1975); H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-505(a)(1)
(1975). Also, the persons whom the bankrupt must intend to hinder, delay, or defraud
would include "any creditor or any officer charged with the custody of such property
under this title." H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-505(a)(1) (1975); H.R. 32, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 4-505(a)(1) (1975).
7. See In re Adlman, 541 F.2d 999, 1003 (2d Cir. 1976); Minnick v. Lafayette Loan
& Trust Co., 392 F.2d 973, 977 (7th Cir. 1968); In re Pioch, 235 F.2d 903, 905-06 (3d Cir.
1956). See also STRASHEIM, Objections to Discharge, in 2 SEMINAR FOR REFEREES IN
BANKRUPTCY 155, 163-64 (1965).

(1042)
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the part of the bankrupt be demonstrated.8 Although the "actual intent"
requirement of section 14c(4) is firmly established, 9 confusion has developed
with regard to its meaning and scope and to its application. This discussion
includes a statement of the policy behind the actual intent test and a
description of the situations to which it applies. Cases which have employed
the actual intent test will be examined as well as the evidentiary and
judicial review problems encountered therein.
II.

THE POLICY AND SCOPE OF THE "ACTUAL INTENT" TEST

The "actual intent" requirement of section 14c(4) has evolved from
judicial construction of the phrase "intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his
creditors."' 10 It reflects the courts' recognition that the purpose of the Act is
to allow a debtor to obtain a fresh start through relieving him of his debts,"
and that absent dishonest actions by the bankrupt he is entitled to be
discharged;1 2 section 14c has consequently been construed liberally in favor
of the bankrupt and strictly against the objecting party.' 3 A bankrupt's
dishonesty can be determined only by considering the intent with which the
bankrupt acts. 14 As a means of distinguishing the honest bankrupt from the
8. See, e.g., In re Adlman, 541 F.2d 999, 1003 (2d Cir. 1976); Halpern v. Schwartz,
426 F.2d 102, 104 (2d Cir. 1970); In re Pioch, 235 F.2d 903, 905 (3d Cir. 1956); In re
Nemerov, 134 F. Supp. 678, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). For a discussion of the rationale for
rejecting the use of "constructive" intent, see note 12 infra.
9. See generally 1 W. LAUBE, W. HILL, & L. KING, COLLIER BANKRUPTCY
MANUAL
14.11, at 14-18 (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER]; Reich,
Bankrupt's Right to a Discharge, 58 COM. L.J. 33, 36 (1953).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 32c(4) (1970). Although the "intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" is
an express element of section 14c(4), the degree of intent needed to satisfy the
requirements of this section has been subject to judicial interpretation. See cases cited
in note 8 supra.
11. See In re Adlman, 541 F.2d 999, 1003 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Kokoszka, 479 F.2d
990, 997 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd sub nor. Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974); In re
Rice & Reuben, 43 F.2d 378, 380 (S.D. Me. 1930). See also Kennedy, Reflections on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States: The Debtor's Fresh Start, 76 W. VA. L. REV.
427, 445-51 (1974). In his article, Professor Kennedy claims that "[t]he role of the
fresh start policy has primarily been one of providing the rationale and thrust for
extending increasing protection of the debtor's right to a discharge in bankruptcy."
Id. at 446.
12. See In re Rice & Reuben, 43 F.2d 378, 379 (S.D. Me. 1930). In Rice & Reuben,
the court stated:
The purpose of [sectionl4c] is to preserve the discharge feature of the
Bankruptcy Act from abuse and to deny its benefits to one who has shown
himself unworthy of them in any of the ways specified in that section. If a purely
constructive intent to hinder creditors is to prevent an honest bankrupt's
discharge, one of the principal purposes of the law will be nullified.
Id. See also STRASHEIM, supra note 7, at 164, where the author explained: "If the
purpose of section 14 is merely to protect against discharge of dishonest bankrupts, it
would seem that the lack of a conscious desire to defraud is decisive." Id.
13. See, e.g., In re Adlman, 541 F.2d 999, 1003 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Kokoszka, 479
F.2d 990, 997 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974);
Minnick v. Lafayette Loan & Trust Co., 392 F.2d 973, 977 (7th Cir. 1968); In re Pioch,
235 F.2d 903, 905 (3d Cir. 1956).
14. See In re Rice & Reuben, 43 F.2d 378, 379 (S.D. Me. 1930). See also In re Pioch,
235 F.2d 903, 906 (3d Cir. 1956) (it is not so much the acts of bankrupt that will
prevent discharge as it is the intent with which he acts).
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dishonest bankrupt, the requirement of specific, actual intent has become
the backbone of section 14c(4). 15
Despite the disjunctive nature of section 14c(4) 16 - intent to hinder or
delay or defraud - only a few courts have denied a discharge when all that
was shown was an actual intent to hinder or delay. 7 Most courts have

15. To further clarify the rational underlying the "actual intent" test, it is helpful
to compare section 14c(4) with similar provisions of the Act. In section 3a(l), 11 U.S.C.
§21a(l) (1970), the same act described in section 14c(4) constitutes an act of
bankruptcy which entitles parties other than the bankrupt to file a petition and
commence bankruptcy proceedings. 11 U.S.C. §21(b) (1970). Unlike section 14c(4),
however, actual intent is not an essential element. Instead, the act of bankruptcy in
section 3a(1) may be satisfied by demonstrating either that the debtor had the intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors or that he "made or suffered a transfer of any
of his property, fraudulent under the provisons of section 67 or 70 of this act." Id.
These transfers include those which are deemed fraudulent, notwithstanding a lack of
actual intent on the part of the bankrupt. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act §67d(2)(a), 11
U.S.C. § 107d(2)(a) (1970) (transfer made without fair consideration by debtor who is
or will thereby be rendered insolvent is fraudulent). A distinction that can be drawn
between section 3 and section 14 is that the rationale behind the former is to make
bankruptcy available to the bankrupt's creditors, notwithstanding the bankrupt's
honesty or lack thereof, whereas the rationale behind the latter is to extricate the
bankrupt from bankruptcy. Thus, while both honest and dishonest bankrupts may be
forced to participate in bankruptcy proceedings, only the honest bankrupt will receive
the benefit of a fresh start that section 14 of the Bankruptcy Act provides. See notes
11 & 12 and accompanying text supra.
One court has concluded that the requirement of actual intent in section 14 is
"buttressed by a comparison of the discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Act with
the provisions . . . relating to setting aside conveyances which are deemed fraudulent
as to creditors." In re Nemerov, 134 F. Supp. 678, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Although
section 67d(2)(a) uses the language, "without regard to his actual intent," section
14c(4) contains no such specific language. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 32c(4) (1970) with id.
§ 107d(2)(a). The Nemerov court therefore reasoned that "if Congress had intended to
foreclose proof of intent in dealing with fraudulent transfers which bar discharge, it
would have used more specific language." 134 F. Supp. at 680. This may be a logical
approach, but it must also be noted that section 67d(2)(d) deals with transfers made
"with actual intent as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or
defraud . . . creditors." 11 U.S.C. § 107d(2)(d) (1970). With this in mind, the Nemerov
court's reasoning may be countered by arguing that if Congress desired actual intent
to be shown under section 14c(4), it would have used specific language, i.e., the word,
"actual."
16. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
17. See In re Rowe, 234 F. Supp. 114, 116 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); In re Perlmutter, 256 F.
862, 869 (D.N.J. 1919), aff'd sub nom. Perlmutter v. Hodspeth, 264 F. 957 (3d Cir. 1920).
In Perlmutter,the court stated: "It is not necessary that intent to defraud be proved. If
the intent to hinder and delay exists, it is sufficient." Id. (emphasis added). This
quoted statement was adopted by the court in Rowe. 234 F. Supp. at 116. One
authority has applied this interpretation to a section 3a(1) act of bankruptcy which
employs the same language. H. BLACK, BANKRUPTCY § 82, at 195 (3d ed. 1922).
Although Black believed that intent to hinder or intent to delay was sufficient for
purposes of section 3a(1), he apparently did not feel this interpretation could extend to
section 14c(4), for he stated that the latter section required "fraudulent intent on the
part of the bankrupt." Id. § 70 at 1341, & n.95. See note 15 supra.
In Coder v. Arts, 213 U.S. 223 (1909), the United States Supreme Court held
that this same language, as used in a former fraudulent conveyance section of the
Act, was aimed at those conveyances intended to defraud. Id. at 242. See also 1 G.
GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 195, at 348 (rev. ed. 1940).
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required that actual fraudulent intent be established.' 8 As the language of
section 14c(4) delineates, this intent to defraud must be directed toward the
creditors of the bankrupt. 19 Examples of this fraudulent intent include the
transfer, removal, or destruction of the bankrupt's property for the purpose
of keeping it out of the creditor's reach. 20 Such action may result in an
"unjust diminution" of his estate and may be sufficient to bar his
21
discharge.
Defining the policy behind the "actual intent" test is necessary in order
to understand its scope. However, a full comprehension of the test can be
achieved only by undertaking a case analysis to see how the test has been
applied and what evidence has been found sufficient and insufficient to
prove actual intent.
III.

THE APPLICATION OF THE "ACTUAL INTENT" TEST

A.

Types of Evidence

The best evidence an objector can produce to establish the actual intent
of the bankrupt is naturally direct evidence. Such evidence is rarely, if ever,
available to the objecting party, however, because actual intent relates to the
bankrupt's state of mind when he committed the act or acts in question and,
hence, cannot be proved directly by objective evidence. Consequently, courts
have often had to infer the existence of actual intent from the factual
22
circumstances.

18. See Minnick v. Lafayette Loan & Trust Co., 392 F.2d 973, 977 (7th Cir. 1968)
(actual intent to defraud); In re Pioch, 235 F.2d 903, 905 (3d Cir. 1956) (actual
fraudulent intent to hinder, delay, or defraud); Arenz v. Astoria Sav. Bank, 281 F. 530,
532 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 740 (1922) (fraudulent intent); Feder v. Goetz, 264
F. 619, 624-25 (2d Cir. 1920) (actual fraudulent intent); In re Nemerov, 134 F. Supp.
678, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (actual intent to defraud); In re Sandler, 26 F. Supp., 841, 842
(D. Md. 1939) (actual intent to defraud). See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
19. 11 U.S.C. §32c(4) (1970). For the pertinent portion of this section, see text
accompanying note 6 supra. For a discussion of the treatment rendered by the
proposed Bankruptcy Acts with respect to whom the intent to defraud must be
directed, see note 6 supra.
20. See H. BLACK, supra note 17, § 670, at 1341. The author stated: "[A]n intention
to dispose of his property in such a way as to keep it beyond the reach of his creditors
is an intention to hinder, delay, and defraud them, and will bar the discharge." Id. See
also Arenz v. Astoria Sav. Bank, 281 F. 530, 532 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 740
(1922); In re Hirsch, 4 F. Supp. 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
21. See In re Freudmann 362 F. Supp. 429, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 495 F.2d 816
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 841 (1974). But see In re Adlman 541 F.2d 999,1004 (2d
Cir. 1976) (mere transfer of nonexempt assets into exempt assets does not show actual
intent to defraud). It is important to note, however, that section 14c(4) is not satisfied
by a mere showing of a fraudulent conveyance unless the fraud relating to the
conveyance "includes the specific intent to defraud creditors." Hayslip v. Long, 227
F.2d 550, 553 (5th Cir. 1955).
22. Such an inference of actual intent must be distinguished from a presumption
of intent which arises as a matter of law. The latter is considered by most courts to be
an improper basis for finding actual intent under section 14c(4) since it is essentially
the equivalent of constructive or implied intent. See In re Adlman, 541 F.2d 999, 1003
(2d Cir. 1976); In re Lupo, 101 F. Supp. 499, 501-02, 502-03 (N.D. Ohio 1951). But see
notes 41-48 and accompanying text infra.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol22/iss5/4

4

Editors: Recent Developments

1046

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 22

In In re Freudmann,23 the Second Circuit found that a clear "pattern of
purposeful conduct" on the part of the bankrupt fully supported a finding of
actual intent to defraud. 24 In that case, a diamond merchant pursued a plan
whereby he purchased diamonds on credit and immediately sold them for
cash, at prices below cost. 25 Although there was no direct evidence of actual

intent to defraud the bankrupt's creditors, the Second Circuit concluded that
the bankruptcy judge's finding of actual intent was justified. 26 The circuit
27
court, apparently influenced by the bankrupt's pattern of purposeful conduct,
likewise inferred that he had actually intended to defraud his creditors.
Many cases deal with only a single disfavored act by the bankrupt;2 in
such instances the inference of actual intent is more difficult to make. One
method of discerning actual intent is through a comparison of the value of
the asset transferred with the value of the consideration received by the
bankrupt. If a valuable asset is transferred for insufficient consideration, an
inference of actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors may be
warranted. 29 Conversely, a court has refused to infer actual intent from the
30
transfer of an asset of minimal value absent other evidence.
23. 495 F.2d 816 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 841 (1974).
24. 495 F.2d at 817.
25. Id.

26. Id. The district court had recognized that actual intent could be proven by
circumstantial evidence. In re Freudmann, 362 F. Supp. 429, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
27. See 495 F.2d at 817.
28. See, e.g., Losner v. Union Bank, 374 F.2d 111, 112 (9th Cir. 1967) (bankrupt
concealed $1000 withdrawal from checking account); In re Pioch, 235 F.2d 903, 908 (3d
Cir. 1956) (bankrupt transferred automobile to employer who completed payments on
loan); In re Woods, 71 F.2d 270, 271 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 601 (1934)
(assignment of stock); In re Richter, 57 F.2d 159, 160 (2d Cir. 1932) (bankrupt
withdrew $3000 to give to wife); In re Rice & Reuben, 43 F.2d 378, 378 (S.D. Me. 1930)
(bankrupt partnership gave automobile to partner's wife).
29. See In re Woods, 71 F.2d 270 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 601 (1934). Woods
involved an assignment by the bankrupt within 12 months of bankruptcy of all stock
in a corporation which owned a valuable 99-year lease on a hotel and theatre. The
assignment was made to second mortgagees in consideration for a six-month option
to reacquire the leasehold upon payment of the outstanding mortgage; however, this
option could only be exercised if the assignees acquired the first mortgage, and they
were under no obligation to do so. Id. at 271. Since the court considered the option to
be inadequate consideration for the stock transfer, it concluded that prima facie
grounds existed for finding an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the bankrupt's
creditors. Id. at 272. The bankrupt, not being able to carry the burden of rebutting this
prima facie case, was denied a discharge. Id. at 272-73. See generally C. NADLER,
BANKRUPTCY § 756, at 627 (2d ed. 1972). But see Minnick v. Lafayette Loan & Trust
Co., 392 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1968). In Minnick, the bankrupts, husband and wife, sold
their home for $500 in cash and the cancellation of $250 indebtedness, although their
equity therein was at least $2,500. Id. at 974-76. The court rejected the creditor's
argument that the substantial variation in equity value of the home and the resulting
sale price manifested an intent to defraud and granted the bankrupts a discharge,
concluding that an inference of actual intent from these facts would involve indulging
in "speculation and surmise." Id. at 976. The bankrupt's open disclosure of the
conveyance and the terms of the sale appeared to have influenced the court in
reaching its decision. See id.
30. See In re Rice & Reuben, 43 F.2d 378 (S.D. Me. 1930). In Rice, the court held
that a gift by an insolvent partnership of an old, relatively worthless automobile to
the wife of one of the partners was not transferred with actual intent to defraud. Id. at
378-79.
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Actual intent may also be inferred from what the bankrupt did with
31
money he possessed during the twelve-month period preceding bankruptcy.
For example, if the bankrupt withdrew a substantial sum of money from his
business or the bank and gave it to his spouse or family without any
consideration in exchange, or if he used it for his own pleasure, an inference
of actual intent may be appropriate. 32 Such an inference may not be drawn,
however, when the bankrupt converts money he possesses into property
which is exempt from creditors' access. 33 It is well settled that a conversion
of nonexempt property into exempt property does not constitute sufficient
evidence to deny the bankrupt's discharge. 34 In In re Adlman,35 the
bankrupt repaid loans and prepaid premiums on insurance policies owned
by her and exempt under state law, even though she was under no personal
obligation to do so. 36 Even though it was clearly her intention to convert the
money into exempt property, the court held that this evidence was
insufficient to infer actual intent to defraud, absent extrinsic evidence of
fraud. 37 The court determined that no extrinsic evidence of fraud was shown
and granted the bankrupt her discharge. 38 The refusal to infer actual

31. Section 14c(4) denials apply only to transfers made within 12 months
preceding the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 32c(4) (1970). For the
text of this section, see text accompanying note 6 supra.
32. See Losner v. Union Bank, 374 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1967). In Losner, the court
held that the bankrupt concealed property with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
his creditors when he withdrew $1,000 from his checking account, carried the money
on his person, and later used the money to purchase money orders with which he
made payments to several of his creditors. Id. at 112. See also In re Finder, 61 F.2d
960, 961-62 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 736 (1933) (bankrupt withdrew $107
from bank to purchase round trip ticket to Florida); In re Richter, 57 F.2d 159, 160 (2d
Cir. 1932) (bankrupt partner withdrew $3,000 from partnership funds for his wife to
use to finance her mother's trip to Europe).
33. Section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1970), provides that the "Act
shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions which are prescribed"
by state law. Id.
34. See In re Adlman, 541 F.2d 999, 1004 (2d Cir. 1976); Wudrick v. Clements, 451
F.2d 988, 989-90 (9th Cir. 1971); Forsberg v. Security State Bank, 15 F.2d 499, 501, 502
(8th Cir. 1926); cf. Schwartz v. Seldon, 153 F.2d 334, 335-36 (2d Cir. 1945) (insured's
trustee in bankruptcy unsuccessful in avoiding transfer from nonexempt to exempt
property).
35. 541 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1976).
36. Id. at 1001. The facts established that the bankrupt sold her home to an aunt
and uncle for $125,000, from which she realized about $60,000. Id. At the time of the
sale, the bankrupt and her husband leased the house back from the relatives in order
to continue occupying it. Id. Concurrent with this "sale and leaseback," the bankrupt
withdrew money from her checking account to repay advancements made on the
insurance policies (totalling $52,653.40) and to prepay certain premiums (totalling
$7,663.22). Id. The bankrupt testified that the purpose of completing these transactions was to prevent the lapse of the insurance policies since her husband was ill and
obtaining new coverage would be difficult. Id.
37. Id. at 1004.
38. Id. at 1005. The dissenting judge in Adlman argued that the undisputed facts
demonstrated a "scheme to defraud creditors." Id. at 1007 (Moore, J., dissenting).
Viewing the sale and leaseback of the bankrupt's home - which he did not consider
an arm's length transaction - in combination with the immediate conversion of the
proceeds into exempt property, the dissenting judge concluded that one could infer an
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud. Id.
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fraudulent intent from the conversion of a bankrupt's nonexempt property
into exempt property appears to spring from a desire to avoid penalizing the
performance of a legal act. 3 9 This explanation has apparently been applied
even where the bankrupt's purpose may indeed have been to keep his
40
property out of the hands of creditors.
Of the courts which adhere to the "actual intent" test, some may also
deem, as a matter of law, certain transfers by the bankrupt to have been
made with actual intent to defraud. 41 This practice appears to be an
outgrowth of an opinion in a 1914 case, In re Julius Brothers.4 2 In that
decision, the court determined that there were two classes of transfers which
might satisfy the required intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. 43 One
class included those transfers which were entered into with actual
fraudulent intent.14 The other class involved those transfers in which the
fraudulent intent is conclusively presumed as a matter of law. 45 The court
noted as the prime example of the latter class a voluntary transfer of the
bankrupt's property while he was insolvent and for which he received no
valuable consideration. 46 Notwithstanding the court's ultimate conclusion
47
that the transfer under consideration did not fall within this second class,

its recognition that such a class exists has caused considerable confusion.
Courts which have recognized this second class have sometimes held
that the transfer at issue was presumptively fraudulent. 4 The language of

39. See Forsberg v. Security State Bank, 15 F.2d 499, 501 (8th Cir. 1926). This case
was heavily relied upon in AdIman. See 541 F.2d at 1004, 1005.
40. See Forsberg v. Security State Bank, 15 F.2d 499, 501 (8th Cir. 1926). In
Forsberg,the bankrupt also knew he was insolvent at the time he made the transfer of
nonexempt property into exempt property. Id. at 502. Nonetheless, the Forsberg court
concluded that "there must appear in evidence some facts or circumstances which are
extrinsic to the mere facts of conversion of nonexempt assets into exempt and which
are indicative of such fraudulent purpose." Id. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
41. See Rothschild v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 212 F.2d 584, 585 (2d Cir. 1954);
In re Julius Bros., 217 F. 3, 7 (2d Cir. 1914); In re Hirsch, 4 F. Supp. 708, 710 (S.D.N.Y.
1933). See generally Rutter v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 70 F.2d 479 (10th Cir.
1934). See also 1 COLLIER, supra note 9, 14.11, at 14-18.
42. 217 F. 3 (2d Cir. 1914).
43. Id. at 7.
44. Id.
45. Id. The conclusive presumption is based upon "the terms of the agreement or
the nature of the transaction itself." Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. The court found that the bankrupts sold all their property for its full value
and, thus, that the transfer was made for valuable consideration. Id. at 4, 7. In
addition, the court concluded that there was no actual intent to defraud. Id. at 7.
48. See Rothschild v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 212 F.2d 584, 585 (2d Cir. 1954);
In re Hirsch, 4 F. Supp. 708, 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1933). In Rothschild, the transfer involved
a house in which the bankrupt and his wife held title. The bankrupt joined with his
wife in conveying title to her alone while he was indebted. 212 F.2d at 585. Because of
this transfer, the court denied the bankrupt his discharge. It stated: "A conveyance
while insolvent, without anything approaching a fair consideration to creditors ... is
presumptively fraudulent within the discharge provisions of the Act." Id. (citations
omitted). It is submitted that the fact that the Rothschild court relied upon the
fraudulent conveyance section of the Act to support its conclusion lessens its potential
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Julius Brothers has, however, been referred to by another court as merely
dictum which "went too far."' 49 Indeed, one can argue that presuming
fraudulent intent conflicts with the basic rule that constructive or implied
intent does not satisfy the requirements of section 14c(4).50 It is submitted
that when actual intent is required to be shown, little, if any, deference
51
should be paid to the second classification of Julius Brothers.
B. Burden of Proof
When exploring the different types of evidence encountered under the
"actual intent" test, it is also important to consider the burden of proof borne
by the parties and the role it plays. Section 14c provides that if the objector
demonstrates reasonable grounds for believing that the bankrupt committed
an act which would prevent his discharge, the bankrupt has to meet the
burden of proving that he has not committed the act. 52 In applying this
provision, courts have construed it to require that the objector show a prima
facie case. 53 Although this burden may not appear to be that heavy, it is
submitted that satisfying the "actual intent" test itself imposes a heavy
burden on the objecting party endeavoring to demonstrate a prima facie
54
case.
impact. See id. at 585, citing Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2)(a), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(a) (1970).
Section 67d(2)(a) expressly precludes any discussion of actual intent. See id.
In Hirsch, the bankrupt repaid loans (advancements) and prepaid premiums
on insurance policies. 4 F. Supp. at 710. The court concluded that since the bankrupt,
"knowing that he was insolvent, deliberately attempted to put beyond the reach of his
creditors a substantial portion of his property by repaying" the loans and prepaying
the premiums, "it is clear that [the bankrupt] presumedly intended to defraud his
creditors. It was a voluntary transfer of his property and without any benefit or return
consideration to the bankrupt's estate." Id. (emphasis added). Since the insurance
policy and the premiums were entitled to exemption under state law, id. at 710, it may
be argued that there was no actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud on the part of
the bankrupt, absent extrinsic evidence of fraud. See notes 34-40 and accompanying
text supra.
49. In re Nemerov, 134 F. Supp. 678, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The Nemerov court
contended that "under the statute, the making of such a gift [as described in Julius
Brothers] merely sets forth a prima facie case of fraudulent intent and shifts the
burden of proving the contrary to the [bankrupt]." Id. (citations omitted). In In re
Adlman, 541 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1976), the Second Circuit disregarded the dictum and
interpreted Julius Brothers as holding that actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud is
not established by a bankrupt making a preference under section 60 of the Act, 11
U.S.C. §96 (1970). 541 F.2d at 1006 n.10.
50. See notes 8 & 9 and accompanying text and note 12 supra.
51. Notwithstanding the probability that the intent required in section 14c(4) will
not be presumed as a matter of law by a court, it is suggested that the same facts
referred to in Julius Brothers as an act warranting the presumption of fraudulent
intent, - a voluntary transfer by one who is insolvent for no valuable consideration
- could support an inferenceof actual intent. See notes 23-32 and accompanying text
supra.
52. 11 U.S.C. §32c (1970).
53. See Feldenstein v. Radio Distrib. Co., 323 F.2d 892, 893 (6th Cir. 1963); In re
Pioch, 235 F.2d 903, 905, 907 (3d Cir. 1956); In re Woods, 71 F.2d 270, 272 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 293 U.S. 601 (1934). See also 1 COLLIER, supra note 9, 14.05, at 14-16.
54. See In re Pioch, 235 F.2d 903, 905-06 (3d Cir. 1956). But see In re Gurney, 71
F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1934). The Gurney court, when confronted with the argument that
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The burden as stated in section 14c has recently been replaced by
Bankruptcy Rule 407,55 which provides that the objector "has the burden of
proving the facts essential to his objection."5 It is difficult to predict what
effect this rule will have on the objector's burden of proving actual intent
under section 14c(4).57 It is submitted, however, that any difference will most

likely be negligible considering the burden imposed by the "actual intent"
test itself.
C. Scope of Review

A final consideration which further complicates questions of evidence
and burden of proof in this area is the scope of the appellate court's review 8
regarding the conclusions of the referee., 9 It is well established that the issue
of actual intent is a question of fact.60 If the referee makes a finding of fact
that the bankrupt performed an act with actual intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud his creditors, this finding must be accepted by the reviewing court
unless clearly erroneous. 6 1 Actual intent, however, is often inferred from
other findings of fact and, as such, is considered to be an ultimate finding of
fact.62 In this situation, the "clearly erroneous" rule may not apply and
actual intent must be shown before a discharge would be denied, concluded that it was
not necessary to decide this question since the objecting party had demonstrated
reasonable grounds for believing that the bankrupt committed the act and the
bankrupt had failed to carry the burden of disproving it. Id. at 145-46. Thus, the
Gurney court determined that submission of evidence of actual intent was not a
prerequisite to establishing a prima facie case.
55. 11 U.S.C. Rule 407 (Supp. V 1975).
56. Id.
57. In a very recent case, In re Adlman, 541 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1976), the dissenting
judge did not apply the standard of proof set forth in rule 407. Rather, he applied the
"reasonable grounds" standard noted in section 14c. Id. at 1006-07 (Moore, J.,
dissenting). This is interesting in light of the fact that rule 407 was then in existence,
yet the dissenting judge did not apply it in concluding that the objecting creditor
showed reasonable grounds for believing that the bankrupt committed the act with
intent to defraud and that the bankrupt failed to carry her burden of proving the
contrary. Id. (Moore, J., dissenting). On the other hand, the majority opinion in
Adlman did not expressly state which standard of proof it applied. It can be inferred,
however, that the "actual intent" test itself was used to impose a heavy burden on the
objecting party. See id. at 1004.
58. See 11 U.S.C. §47 (1970).
59. For the jurisdiction and duties of a referee in bankruptcy, see 11 U.S.C. §§ 66-

67 (1970).

60. See, e.g., Losner v. Union Bank, 374 F.2d 111, 112 (9th Cir. 1967); Arenz v.
Astoria Sav. Bank, 281 F. 530, 532 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 740 (1922); In re
Parnell Lumber Co., 107 F. Supp. 794, 800 (N.D. Ohio 1951); In re Beggs, 93 F. Supp.
863, 865 (N.D. Ohio 1950); cf. Misty Management Corp. v. Lockwood, 539 F.2d 1205,
1211 (9th Cir. 1976).
61. 11 U.S.C. Rule 810 (Supp. V 1975). Bankruptcy Rule 810 provides in pertinent
part: "The court shall accept the referee's findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous, and shall give due regard to the opportunity of the referee to judge of [sic]
the credibility of the witnesses." Id. See Losner v. Union Bank, 374 F.2d 111, 112 (9th
Cir. 1967); In re Simon, 197 F. Supp. 301, 303 (E.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd sub nor. Simon v.
Agar, 299 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1962); cf. Misty Management Corp. v. Lockwood, 539 F.2d
1205, 1211 (9th Cir. 1976).
62. See Minnick v. Lafayette Loan & Trust Co., 392 F.2d 973, 977 (7th Cir. 1968)
(ultimate finding); Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 1958) (factual
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greater review may be exercised by the higher courts. 63 More specifically,
when a finding of actual intent is drawn from undisputed facts, the courts
64
feel that they, as well as the referee, can reach accurate conclusions.
Although the reviewing court is dealing with a question of intent which
often may be best determined by the referee - particularly when the
bankrupt has testified before him 65 - this factor has not prevented appellate
courts from setting aside the referee's findings either under the "clearly
66
erroneous" approach or under the "greater freedom of review" approach.
In AdIman, for example, the Second Circuit concluded that the bankruptcy
judge's finding of actual intent was "induced by an erroneous view of the
law" and was, therefore, incorrect as a matter of law and as a matter of
fact.6 7 It is submitted that this liberal standard of review, which ignores the
referee's need to draw inferences in reaching conclusions, may undermine
his role as a fact finder.
IV.

CONCLUSION

An understanding of the policy behind the "actual intent" test of section
14c(4) and the discharge provisions in general68 may aid in further
comprehending a court's - especially an appellate court's - application of
the test. Courts do prefer to relieve the bankrupt from bankruptcy by giving
him a fresh start through discharge.6 9 As a result, an objecting party should
either be able to establish a very compelling case when seeking to obtain a
denial of discharge under section 14c(4), or abandon the attempt. If there
is no direct evidence of actual intent, it will need to be inferred, and the
facts supporting that inference will have to be very persuasive. 70 It is
extremely doubtful that a court. will presume or imply the intent, which, in
7
the usual case, will need to be fraudulent. 1
To achieve the objectives of section 14c(4), 72 actual intent must continue
to be required. It is hoped, however, that the appellate courts will refrain
conclusion from given facts); In re Pioch, 235 F.2d 903, 905 (3d Cir. 1956) (ultimate
finding of fact); In re Masor, 117 F.2d 368, 370 (7th Cir. 1941) (conclusion by referee);
In re Rowe, 234 F. Supp. 114, 116 (E.D.N.Y. 1964) (inference from undisputed facts).
See also In re Adlman, 541 F.2d 999, 1003 n.5 (2d Cir. 1976).
63. See cases cited in note 62 supra.
64. See, e.g., Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 1958).
65. See In re Adlman, 541 F.2d 999, 1007 (2d Cir. 1976) (Moore, J., dissenting).
66. See cases cited in note 62 supra. Indeed, one court has concluded that the
referee's findings were unwarranted under either approach. Minnick v. Lafayette
Loan & Trust Co., 392 F.2d 973, 977 (7th Cir. 1968).

67. 541 F.2d at 1005 (emphasis added). The dissent, on the other hand, felt that
the "clearly erroneous rule" applied since a factual question was involved: whether
the bankrupt acted with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud. Id. at 1006 (Moore,
J., dissenting). The dissent believed the bankruptcy judge's finding of actual intent
was supported by the testimony, and, hence, not clearly erroneous. Id. at 1007 (Moore,
J., dissenting).
68. See notes 10-15 and accompanying text supra.
69. See note 12 and accompanying text supra. See also Phillips, Order of
Discharge and Post-Bankruptcy Litigation, 16 MERCER L. REV. 409, 409 (1965).
70. See notes 22-40 and accompanying text supra.
71. See notes 41-51 and accompanying text supra.
72. See note 12 supra.
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from exercising their review powers so liberally; 73 if it is shown that the

referee's application of the "actual intent" test was not clearly erroneous,
deference should be given to his conclusion on this question of fact.
Stuart J. Agins

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - PHILADELPHIA HOME RULE CHARTER RECALL
PROVISION HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Citizens Committee to Recall Rizzo v. Board of Elections
of Philadelphia(Pa. 1976)
In 1951, the people of the city of Philadelphia adopted a home rule
charter' pursuant to enabling legislation 2 effectuating a provision in the
Pennsylvania Constitution. 3 That Charter provided for the recall, without
cause, of elected public officials by the electorate.4
Twenty-five years later, on June 15, 1976, the Citizens Committee to
Recall Rizzo (Recall Committee) submitted to the Board of Elections of
Philadelphia (Board) a petition to recall the Honorable Frank L Rizzo,
mayor of Philadelphia. 5 Validation of the petition and placement of the
recall question on the November 2nd ballot for the general election required
7
a Board finding that at least 145,488 signatures" of the 210,806 submitted
were in compliance with the charter provisions.8 Before the expiration of the
fifteen-day statutory period allotted the Board to determine the validity or
73. See notes 60-67 and accompanying text supra.
1. 351 PA CODE §§ 1.1-100 to 12.12-503 (1974).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13101 (Purdon 1957). Pursuant to this provision
"[any city of the first class may frame and adopt a charter for its own government."

Id.

3. PA. CONsT. art. IX, § 2. This constitutional provision states that "[miunicipalities shall have the right and power to frame and adopt home rule charters ....
A
municipality which has a home rule charter may exercise any power or perform any
function not denied by this Constitution, by its home rule charter or by the General
Assembly at any time." Id.
4. 351 PA. CODE §§9.9-100 to 9.9-105 (1974). Section 9.9-100 provides in
pertinent part: "Any person holding an elective office of the city ... shall be subject
to removal from office at a recall election ....
Id. Note 2 to section 9.9-100 provides
an indication of the framers' intent: "While no charges are required to be lodged
formally against an elected official to subject him to a recall election, it is anticipated
...that the electorate will use its power to recall wisely, for good reasons and in
accordance with the purposes and spirit of the recall. Id.
5. Citizens Comm. to Recall Rizzo v. Bd. of Elections, Pa. 367
A.2d 232, 233 (1976) (Jones, C.J.) (plurality).
6. Id. at n.5, 367 A.2d at 233 n.5. This number represented 25% of the votes
cast for the office of mayor in the preceding mayoral election. Id.
7. Id. at n.5, 367 A.2d at 233 n.5.
8. 351 PA. CODE § 9.9-101(1), (3) (1974). The charter provides:
In the case of an elective office to which a candidate is elected from the City at
large, the petition shall contain signatures equal in number to at least twenty-five
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invalidity of the petition, 9 it asked the Court. of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia for an extension in order to.complete the process,' 0 and an
extension was granted." A further extension was sought as the new
deadline neared,' 2 but prior to a determination on the petition for extension,
the Board rejected. the recall petition, declaring' it invalid due to an
3
insufficient number of valid signatures.
Following this rejection, the Recall Committee filed an action in
mandamus against the Board to.compel it to validate the petition and place
the question of recall on the November ballot." Mayor Rizzo petitioned to
intervene and became codefendant with the Board.' 5 Mandamus was
6
granted by.the trial court, and. both defendants appealed.'
On review, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that mandamus
had been granted improperly by the lower court' 7 and that the recall petition
was invalid in that the recall provision in the Home Rule Charter violated
the state constitution.' 8" Citizens Committee to Recall Rizzo v. Board of
Elections of Philadelphia,
Pa. -, 367 A.2d 232 (1976).
Although there had been litigation in Pennsylvania involving the
removal of 'public officers prior to the Rizzo case,' 9' the Pennsylvania
percent of the vote cast for the office of Mayor at the last preceding mayoralty
election.
(3) ... The board may question the genuineness of any signature or
signatures appearing on the recall petition and if it shall find that any such
signature or signatures are not genuine, it shall disregard them in determining
whether the 'petition contains a sufficient number of.signatures.
Id.
9. Id. § 9.9-101(3). The Board is required to "complete its examination of the
petition within fifteen days and ... thereupon file the petition if valid or reject it if
invalid." Id.
10.

-

Pa. at

-

, 367 A.2d at 233 (Jones, C.J.) (plurality).

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id,The Board found that there were only 88,894 valid signatures on the
petition. Id. at

14. Id. at
15. Id. at

__
-,

__,

n.5, 367 A.2d at 233 n.5.

367 A.2d at 233.
367 A.2d at 233.

16. Id. at __, 367 A.2d at 233. Recognizing that many people were interested in
the outcome of the case and that the litigation had to be resolved before the date for
placing the recall question.on the November ballot, the lower qourt accelerated the
proceeding pursuant to Rule 1003 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at
367 A.2d at 233.
17. Id. at -,
367 A.2d at 244 (Jones, CJ.) (plurality). See notes 48-69 and
accompanying text infra.
18. Pa. at -,
367 A.2d at 244 (Jones, C.J.) (plurality). Chief Justice Jones,
Justice Manderino, Justice Nix, and Justice O'Brien voted to strike down the recall
petition on constitutional grounds. Id. at -, 367 A.2d at 244 (Jones, C.J.) (plurality);
Id. at -,
367 A.2d at 249-50 (Nix, J,, concurring); Id. at -,
367 A.2d at 247
(O'Brien, J., concurring). Justices Eagen, Pomeroy, and Roberts dissented. Id.at __,
367 A.2d at 257 (Eagen, J., dissenting); Id. at 1, 367 A.2d at 270 (Pomeroy, J.,
dissenting); Id. at -,
367 A.2d at 287 (Roberts, J., dissenting). There were six
opinions, and there was no majority opinion of the court. For a discussion of the
justices' interpretations of the relevant constitutional provisions, see notes 72-98 and
accompanying text infra.
19. Watson v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'rs, 386 Pa. 117, 125 A.2d 354 (1956)
(turnpike commissioners not subject to removal at will of appointing power when that
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Supreme Court had never considered the question of removal without cause
of a nonconstitutional elected public official - i.e., one holding an office
created by the legislature, not the constitution - by the process of recall.20
The removal cases that had reached constitutional dimensions had been
resolved through the court's interpretations of sections 1 and 7 of article VI
of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Article VI, section 1 (section 1) states that "[a]ll officers, whose selection
is not provided for in this Constitution, shall be elected or appointed as may
be directed by law."'21 Article VI, section 7 (section 7) provides:
All civil officers shall hold their offices on the condition that they
behave themselves well while in office, and shall be removed on
conviction of misbehavior in office or of any infamous crime. Appointed
civil officers, other than judges of the courts of record, may be removed
at the pleasure of the power by which they shall have been appointed.
All civil officers, elected by the people, except the Governor, the
Lieutenant Governor, members of the General Assembly and judges of
the courts of record, shall be removed by the Governor for reasonable
cause, after due notice and full hearing, on the address of two-thirds of
22
the Senate.
Section 1 gave the legislature the power to create offices to which
officeholders could be appointed or elected. The Court had consistently read
into this section the implied power of the legislative body to condition tenure
of such legislatively created offices, including the power to establish
methods for removal from office. 23 This provision, however, gave the
power has been legislatively restricted); Appeal of Foltz, 370 Pa. 567, 88 A.2d 871
(1952) (township supervisors not subject to removal when legislatively imposed
conditions for removal were not fulfilled); Lumley v. Town Council, 362 Pa. 532, 66
A.2d 833 (1949) (burgess reinstated because notice required by case law was not given
prior to his removal); In re Marshall, 360 Pa. 304, 62 A.2d 30 (1948) (receiver of taxes
of Philadelphia may be removed by legislatively prescribed method from legislatively
created office); Weiss v. Ziegler, 327 Pa. 100, 193 A. 642 (1937) (legislature has power to
condition tenure of legislatively created offices); Commonwealth ex rel. Smillie v.
McElwee, 327 Pa. 148, 193 A. 628 (1937) (Board of Assessment and Revision of Taxes
not subject to ouster by legislative body which neither created nor appointed it); In re
Supervisors, 291 Pa. 46, 139 A. 623 (1927) (township supervisors subject to removal by
legislatively created method); In re Georges Township School Directors, 286 Pa. 128,
133 A. 223 (1926) (school director subject to removal pursuant to legislation which
preceded adoption of Pennsylvania Constitution of 1873 and which was neither
nullified nor limited by the constitutional provision for removal); Commonwealth ex
rel. Vesneski v. Reid, 265 Pa. 328, 108 A. 829 (1919) (borough burgess held to be
nonconstitutional elected officer subject to constitutional removal provision in the
absence of any legislatively prescribed method of removal); In re Bowman, 225 Pa.
364, 74 A. 203 (1909) (justice of peace held to be constitutional officer subject only to
constitutional removal provisions).
20. Pa. at __ 367 A.2d at 290 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
21. PA. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
22. Id. §7.
23. In Milford Township Supervisors' Removal, 291 Pa. 46, 139 A. 623 (1927), the
court held that the legislatively devised methods of removal of officers were
acceptable even though contrary to the constitutional removal provisions "where the
Legislature, having the right to fix the length of a term of office, has made it
determinable, by judicial proceedings, on other contingencies than the mere passage
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legislature no authority over offices which were specifically created by the
24
constitution.
Section 7 had been declared mandatory and exclusive for all constitutional offices, i.e., those established by the constitution itself,25 but not for
legislatively created offices under section 1.26 In In re Bowman, 27 for
example, a justice of the peace was held to be a constitutional officer, for
whom the constitution provided the sole means of removal. 28 In contrast, in
Weiss v. Zeigler 29 a school district superintendent was held to be subject to
the terms for removal fixed by the statute which had created his office. 30
Prior to Rizzo, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had agreed that the
first clause of section 7 referring to "[all civil officers" was mandatory for
both constitutional and legislatively created officers; 31 no officer convicted
of "misbehavior in office or of any infamous crime" 32 could remain in office.
Although the court had recognized good behavior as one constitutional

of time." Id. at 52, 139 A. at 625. The court again recognized the legislature's power to
condition tenure of legislatively created offices in Weiss v. Ziegler, 327 Pa. 100, 193 A.
642 (1937), where the court considered the removal of a district superintendent of
schools. Id. at 104, 193 A. at 644. likewise, in In re Marshall, 360 Pa. 304, 62 A.2d 30
(1948), the court held that the receiver of taxes of Philadelphia was a legislatively
created office and that the officeholder could be removed by a legislatively prescribed
method. Id. at 310, 62 A.2d at 33.
24. See Pa. at -,
367 A.2d at 295 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at -, 367 A.2d at 288. See, e.g., In re Georges Township School Directors,
286 Pa. 128, 133 A. 223 (1926); In re Bowman, 225 Pa. 364, 74 A. 203 (1909). See also
Reid v. Smoulter, 128 Pa. 324, 18 A. 445 (1889). The text of the present article VI,
section 7 is similar to that of article VI, section 4, the relevant section at the time
Georges Township and Bowman were decided. Article VI, section 4 was renumbered
article VI, section 7 by amendment in 1966.
26. Pa. at -,
367 A.2d at 288-89 (Roberts, J., dissenting). See, e.g.,
Commonwealth ex reL. Houlahen v. Flynn, 348 Pa. 101, 34 A.2d 59 (1943);
Commonwealth ex reL. Braughler v. Weir, 165 Pa. 284, 30 A. 835 (1895); Commonwealth v. McCombs, 56 Pa. 436 (1867). See also, Graham v. Collins, 316 Pa. 353, 175 A.
427 (1934); Commonwealth ex reL. Elkin v. Moir, 199 Pa. 534, 49 A. 351 (1901); Lloyd v.
Smith, 176 Pa. 213, 35 A. 199 (1896); Commonwealth v. Schneipp, 166 Pa. 401, 31 A.
118 (1895); Bigley v. Borough of Bellevue, 158 Pa. 495, 28 A. 23 (1893); Neuls v. City of
Scranton, 20 Pa. Super. Ct. 286 (1902). See note 25 supra with respect to the
numbering of article VI, section 7 between 1874 and 1966. Prior to 1874, the relevant
provision was article VI, section 9.
27. 225 Pa. 364, 74 A. 203 (1909).
28. Id. at 368, 74 A. at 204. The court in Bowman said, however, that "others
filling purely legislative offices may be without the constitutional provision as to
removal . . . " Id.
29. 327 Pa. 100, 193 A. 642 (1937).
30. Id. at 105, 193 A. at 645.
31. See, e.g., McSorley v. Pa. Turnpike Comm., 390 Pa. 81, 134 A.2d 201 (1957); In
re Kline Township School Directors, 353 Pa. 91, 44 A.2d 377 (1945); Commonwealth v.
Rosser, 102 Pa. Super. Ct. 78, 156 A. 751 (1930).
The court in Commonwealth ex reL. Woods v. Davis, 299 Pa. 276, 149 A. 176
(1930), upheld the removal from office of the mayor of the city of Johnstown who had
been convicted of misbehavior in office. Id. at 283, 149 A. at 179. It declared that the
first clause of article VI, section 7 was mandatory and self-executing. Id. at 279, 149 A.
at 178. Accord, Commonwealth v. Rosser, 102 Pa. Super. Ct. 78, 156 A. 751 (1930). See
note 25 supra with respect to the numbering of article VI, section 7 prior to 1966.
32. PA. CONST. art. VI, §7, cl. 1.
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condition for retaining office, it had also interpreted the clause as not
being exclusive with respect to legislatively created offices, so that
legislative bodies were permitted to attach other conditions of tenure to
4
those offices which they had created pursuant to section 1.3
Similarly, the supreme court had subscribed to a uniform interpretation
of the second clause; that the appointing power could remove at will was
simply a reflection of the common law doctrine.3 5 Case law established,
however, the right of legislatures to limit the power of removal from offices
which they had created.36 For instance, in Watson v. Pennsylvania Turnpike
Commissioners,37 the supreme court held that the power to remove an
appointed turnpike commissioner was limited by a legislatively imposed
condition that prescribed a rotation for the four commissioners.:" The court
reasoned that the legislature intended that such a rotation system ensure
that only one commissioner would be new and inexperienced each year and
that the three incumbents would sustain a quorum and guarantee the
desired continuity of programs and policies.;" The unrestricted authority of
the appointing power to remove more than one commissioner at a time
would frustrate that intent."'1
The third clause of section 7 had never been questioned in the factual
setting presented by the instant case - removal without cause of a
nonconstitutional elected public official. 41 Previous cases concerning the
removal of such an official had involved removal for cause. 4 2 For example,
in Milford Township Supervisors' Removal,4 : the supreme court approved
the method created by the legislature for the removal of an elected township
supervisor whose six-year term was subject to judicial divestment if he
refused or neglected to perform his duties. 44 The Milford court reasoned that
section 7 was not the exclusive means of removal that applied to
nonconstitutional elected public officers.45 Despite the court's finding that
33. Milford Township Supervisors' Removal, 291 Pa. 46, 51, 139 A. 623, 625 (1927).
See note 47 and accompanying text infra and text accompanying notes 43-47 infra.
34. Pa. at __, 367 A.2d at 248 (O'Brien, J., concurring), citing Weiss v.
Ziegler, 327 Pa. 100, 193 A. 642 (1937).
35. Pa. at __, 367 A.2d at 251 (Nix, J., concurring). See Commonwealth ex
rel. Houlahen v. Flynn, 348 Pa. 101, 34 A.2d 59 (1943); Kraus v. City of Philadelphia,
337 Pa. 30, 10 A.2d 393 (1940); Myers v. Hartnett, 153 Pa. Super. Ct. 228, 33 A.2d 512
(1943). See also 4 E. McQuILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 12.229b (3d
ed. 1968).
36. See, e.g., Schluraff v. Rzymek, 417 Pa. 144, 208 A.2d 239 (1965); McCandless
Township v. Wylie, 375 Pa. 378, 100 A.2d 596 (1953); Commonwealth ex rel. Houlahen
v. Flynn, 348 Pa. 101, 34 A.2d 59 (1943); Malone v. Hayden, 329 Pa. 213, 197 A. 344
(1938); Visor v. Waters, 320 Pa. 406, 182 A. 241 (1936) (dictum).
37. 386 Pa. 117, 125 A.2d 354 (1956).
38. Id. at 124, 125 A.2d at 356-57.
39. Id. at 124-25, 125 A.2d at 357.
40. Id. at 125, 125 A.2d at 357.
41. __ Pa. at -,
367 A.2d at 238 (Jones, C.J.) (plurality).
42. Id. at -,
367 A.2d at 290 (Roberts, J., dissenting). See, e.g., In re Marshall,
360 Pa. 304, 62 A.2d 30 (1948) (any corrupt act or practice held to be "cause").
43. 291 Pa. 46, 139 A. 623 (1927).
44. Id. at 50, 139 A. at 624.
45. Id. at 52, 139 A. at 624.
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the condition in the statute prescribing removal was simply another way of
stating the constitutional condition that "they [the supervisors] behave
themselves well while in office," 46 it also concluded that legislatures could
always make offices, which they had created, determinable on "contingen47
cies [other] than the mere passage of time."
It was against this background of constitutional interpretation that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down the recall provision embodied in
the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter. Prior to reaching the constitutional
issue, Chief Justice Jones explored the propriety of the grant of mandamus.4" Noting that the lower court had jurisdiction to hear the case through
a petition for a writ of mandamus, 49 he stressed that such a writ will not
issue if there is another "adequate, appropriate, and specific remedy
available." 50 In response to arguments by the Board and Mayor Rizzo that a
51
specific remedy was available under the Local Agency Law, the Chief
Justice stated that within the meaning of that statute, no "parties ' '5 2 had
participated in the Board proceeding, and no "adjudication 5 3 had been
46. Id. at 51, 139 A. at 625.
47. Id. at 52, 139 A. at 625. The Milford court recognized a limitation on
legislative authority to prescribe conditions. It noted that the statute at issue required
a judicial

proceeding to determine whether legislatively created conditions

for

removal had been met before the court could declare the office vacant. Id. at 50, 139 A.
at 624. Therefore, Milford sanctioned legislatively created methods of removal for
legislatively created offices, but only after "proper" judicial proceedings. Id. at 50, 139
A. at 624-25. Nothing was said about the right of the people to recall a public official
absent some kind of procedural due process.
48. Pa. at __
367 A.2d at 234-39 (Jones, C.J.) (plurality).
49. Id. at -, 367 A.2d at 234. The court cited PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1911
(Purdon 1967). Id. at n.7, 367 A.2d at 234 n.7.
50. Pa. at __,
367 A.2d at 234 (Jones, C.J.) (plurality). See, e.g., Valley Forge
Racing Ass'n, Inc. v. State Horse Racing Comm'n, 449 Pa. 292, 297 A.2d 823 (1972)
(plaintiffs seeking to compel commission to revoke competitor's license had another
remedy in that they could contest renewal of license when matter came up on a yearly
basis); Hutnik v. School District, 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 387, 302 A.2d 873 (1973)
(mandamus cannot be invoked by discharged temporary school teacher seeking
reinstatement where alternative remedy available - the right to appeal under the
Local Agency Law).
51.
- Pa. at _
, 367 A.2d at 235 (Jones, C.J.) (plurality) citing PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, § 11307 (Purdon 1972). The Local Agency Law provides that
[a]ny person aggrieved by a final adjudication who has a direct interest in
such adjudication shall have the right to appeal therefrom. Such appeal, unless
otherwise provided by a statute authorizing a particular appeal, shall be taken
within thirty days to the court of common pleas of any judicial district in which
the local agency has jurisdiction.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11307 (Purdon 1972).
52. Under the statute, a "party" means "any person who appears in a proceeding
before a local agency who has a direct interest in the subject matter of such
proceeding." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11302(3) (Purdon 1972). The Home Rule Charter
established the procedure for the Board's validating a recall petition. 351 PA. CODE
§ 9.9-101(3) (1974). Nowhere did it provide that anyone, other than Board members,
could participate in the proceeding. Chief Justice Jones reasoned therefore, that the
Recall Committee could not have been a "party" if it had not participated in the
proceeding by which it now claims to have been aggrieved. Pa. at -, 367 A.2d
at 235 (Jones, C.J.) (plurality).
53. An "adjudication" under the Local Agency Law is "any final order, decree,
decision, determination or ruling by a local agency affecting personal or property

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol22/iss5/4

16

Editors: Recent Developments

1058

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 22

rendered. Thus, the appeal remedy set forth therein was not available to
provide review of the Board's rejection of the recall petition.54
Recognizing that mandamus may issue only to compel a public officer or
ss
agency to perform a ministerial duty or to prevent an abuse of discretion,
Chief Justice Jones stated that the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter
imposed both a ministerial 6 and a discretionary duty5 7 on the Board. Since
the Board had complied with its ministerial duty by issuing a determination
regarding the petition's validity within fifteen days and had discharged its
discretionary obligation by determining the petition's invalidity,5 8 the Chief
Justice reasoned that the Board could be compelled to act in a contrary
fashion only if it had exceeded the bounds of discretion established by
reasonableness and good faith., "
In order to determine whether or not the Board had exceeded the lawful
parameters of its discretion in invalidating the recall petition, the Chief
rights, privileges, immunities or obligations of any or all of the parties to the
proceeding in which the adjudication is made ...." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11302(1)
(Purdon 1972). The Chief Justice stated that since the Recall Committee was not a
"party" in the proceeding before the Board, there was no adjudication in that no
evidence was presented by the Committee in support of its position. - Pa. at __,
367 A.2d at 236 (Jones, C.J.) (plurality).
54. -_ Pa. at ,367 A.2d at 236 (Jones, C.J.) (plurality). But see Kretzler v.
Ohio Township, 14 Pa. Commw. Ct. 236, 322 A.2d 157 (1974) (action by board of
supervisors reducing rank of two police officers held to be "adjudication" even though
officers did not participate in the proceeding).
Justice Eagen stated in his dissenting opinion that the Local Agency Act
which "mandates an adversary hearing whenever a determination is made that
otherwise constitutes an 'adjudication'" should be read in conjunction with the home
rule charter, and that the Board should have afforded all parties an opportunity to be
heard, thereby creating a record which would have been adjudicative of the parties'
rights. Pa. at ,367 A.2d at 258-59 (Eagen, J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice
Eagen stressed that being denied the right to argue and present evidence in the same
forum prior to an adjudication of parties' rights violated a doctrine "fundamental to
our system of law." Id. at -, 367 A.2d at 260. Though Justice Eagen believed that
the recall provision was constitutional, his advocating an adversary hearing before a
determination can be made on the validity or invalidity of the recall petition appears
to impart at least a constructive procedural due process condition to the method of
removal.
55. Id. at -, 367 A.2d at 236 (Jones, C.J.) (plurality) citing Valley Forge Racing
Ass'n v. State Horse Racing Comm'n, 449 Pa. 292, 297 A.2d 823 (1972) (mandamus
denied because, inter alia, commissioners' duty to issue licenses was considered
discretionary under the Horse Racing Act); Rose Tree Media School District v. Dep't of
Pub. Instruction, 431 Pa. 233, 244 A.2d 754 (1968) (mandamus allowed to compel
payment to plaintiff of reimbursable transportation funds approved by defendant
since duty to pay was mandatory); and Raffel v. City of Pittsburgh, 340 Pa. 243, 16
A.2d 392 (1940) (mandamus denied to reinstate civil service employee as court found
no abuse of discretion in dismissal procedure at administrative level).
56. Pa. at , 367 A.2d at 237 (Jones, C.J.) (plurality). The Chief Justice
stated that under the Charter "the Board is obliged to 'complete its examination of the
petition within fifteen days and . . .thereupon file the petition if valid or reject it if
invalid.' This duty is purely ministerial .
Id., quoting 351 PA. CODE § 9.9-101(3)
(1974).

57. Pa. at , 367 A.2d at 237 (Jones, C.J.) (plurality). The Chief Justice
noted that "[in reaching the decision of whether to accept the petition, the Board is
accorded the ultimate discretion as to the validity of the petition." Id.
58. See notes 9-13 and .accompah.ying text supra.
59.

-

Pa. at

-

,367 A.2d at 237 (Jones, C.J.) (plurality).
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Justice examined the sufficiency of the evidence before the Board.60 He
reviewed the signed affidavits accompanying the petition 6' and agreed with
the Board that the following sheets of signatures were invalid regardlessof
the genuineness of the individual signatures: 1) sheets on which twenty-five
per cent or more of the signatures were deemed "irregular," 62 since the
affiants must have known of the irregularities and therefore could not
truthfully have sworn to the affidavits;6 3 2) sheets accompanied by
affidavits notarized by "interested" persons, since this constituted a
violation of the Notary Public Law; 64 and 3) sheets accompanied by
affidavits on which the affiant listed an incorrect address or falsely stated
that he was a registered voter. 65 Invalidation of these sheets had the effect of
invalidating the entire petition for lack of the requisite number of
signatures. 66 Justices Nix and Manderino agreed that the sheets
accompanying the affidavits unlawfully notarized by interested persons
60. Id. at

-

,367 A.2d at 238-39.

61. Id. at -, 367 A.2d at 240-43. The Philadelphia Home Rule Charter requires
that each sheet of the recall petition be accompanied by an affidavit, attesting that
to the best of the affiant's knowledge and belief the persons whose signatures
appear on the sheet are registered electors of the City, or of the district, as the case
may be, that they signed with full knowledge of the contents of the petition, and
that their residences are correctly given.
351 PA. CODE § 9.9-101(2) (1974).
62. Pa. at -, 367 A.2d at 240-41 (Jones, C.J.) (plurality). Chief Justice
Jones explained that "irregularities included ... obvious forgeries, non-registered
citizens, duplicative signings, non-existent persons and addresses, and gross filling in
of spaces of the petitions by persons other than the purported signators." Id.
63. Id. at -,
367 A.2d at 241. Chief Justice Jones held an affiant to some
knowledge of the facts to which he swore. He reasoned that if many of the facts were
false, the affiant must have known that they were false and that, therefore, he falsely
swore to the affidavit which nullified the affidavit. Id. Since the sheets must be
accompanied by a valid affidavit, nullifying the affidavit compels disregarding the
sheets of the petition. Id. In addition, the fact that the affiants refused to respond to
the Board's subpoenas to explain the irregularities raised an inference, according to
the Chief Justice, that their testimony would have been detrimental to them. Id.
64. Id. at -,
367 A.2d at 242-43, citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 165(e) (Purdon
1964). The Notary Public Law provides that "[n]o notary public may act as such in
any transaction in which he is a party directly or pecuniarily interested." PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 57, § 165(e) (Purdon 1964). Sixteen people who were associated with the
Recall Committee notarized affidavits attached to petitions. Pa.at __, 367 A.2d

at 242 (Jones, C.J.) (plurality). Chief Justice Jones acknowledged that the question of
whether or not a person would be barred from acting as a notary public because of his
interest in a case would have to be determined by the facts of each case. Id. He noted
that in the present case, the notaries had a great interest in the achievement of
certain political goals for which they expended much effort. Id. Such interest tended to
destroy the impartiality required of a notary fulfilling his statutory charge. Id. at __,
367 A.2d at 243.
65. Id. at -, 367 A.2d at 241. Chief Justice Jones reasoned that "[a]ny falsity in
an affidavit casts doubt on the accuracy of the entire affidavit and thus, the
authenticity of the petition." Id.
66. Id. at - n.27, 367 A.2d at 243 n.27. Justice Pomeroy disagreed with Chief
Justice Jones' reasoning that the Board properly excluded signature sheets
containing 25% or more irregular signatures and those illegally notarized, while
Justice Roberts disagreed with all three categories for exclusion. Id. at
,367
A.2d at 272-73 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting); Id. at

- ...

367 A.2d at 279, 284

(Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Roberts argued that in the absence of fraud, no

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol22/iss5/4

18

Editors: Recent Developments

1060

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

(VOL. 22

should be invalidated and that this in itself would be a sufficient number of
signatures to invalidate the petition. 67 Consequently, Chief Justice Jones,
Justice Nix, and Justice Manderino found that the evidence before the Board
was sufficient to invalidate the recall petition and that, therefore, the Board
had not abused its discretion or acted contrary to law. 68 Thus, the court held
69
that mandamus to compel validation of the recall petition could not issue.
Had the court stopped here, the recall provision in the Philadelphia
Home Rule Charter would have remained viable legislation. Chief Justice
Jones, however, proceeded to decide the constitutionality of the recall

elector should be disenfranchised just because his signature happened to be on a sheet
with irregular signatures. Id. at __, 367 A.2d at 278. He reasoned that
[t]he difficulty with the position . . . is that . . . persons whose signatures are
admittedly genuine and whose signatures were properly obtained, are disenfranchised through no fault of theirs and because their names happen to be on sheets
which contain names that are irregular. In the absence of proof that the
signatures were not genuine, it would be unjust to rule out such signatures.
Id., quoting Lefkowitz v. Cohen, 262 App. Div. 452, 456; 29 N.Y.S.2d 817, 821, aff'd 286
N.Y. 499, 36 N.E.2d 680 (1941). Similarly, according to Justice Roberts, no elector
should be disenfranchised because the affiant's address or registration status was
incorrect on the affidavit. -

Pa. at __,

367 A.2d at 279 (Roberts, J., dissenting). He

argued that the Home Rule Charter did not require the affiant to give his address nor
did it require that he be a registered voter. Id. He stated that "[tihe Board's action in

rejecting these affidavits, was arbitrary and capricious." Id. Lastly, he argued that no
elector should be disenfranchised because an affidavit was notarized by an
367 A.2d at 284. Justice Roberts examined the Notary
"interested" party. Id. at -,
Public Law and concluded that "[t]he provision of the Notary Public Law is aimed at
situations where the notary's self interest creates a serious danger of fraud ....

Such

is not the case here, where, as the Board's own investigation discovered, the petition
sheets which the Opinion of the Chief Justice states were illegally notarized contain
genuine and valid signatures." Id. at -, 367 A.2d at 284. Both Justices Pomeroy
and Roberts concluded that the evidence before the Board was insufficient to support
a finding of invalidity. Id. at -, 367 A.2d at 270-73 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting); Pa. at -, 367 A.2d at 277-84 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Both agreed that by the
Board's so finding, it abused its discretion, acted contrary to law, and should be
subjected to the mandamus issued by the trial court. Id. at _ , 367 A.2d at 270-73
(Pomeroy, J., dissenting); Id.

at

____

,

367 A.2d at 279, 282 (Roberts, J.,

dissenting).
67. Id. at
, 367 A.2d at 249 (Nix, J., concurring).
68. Id. at
,367 A.2d at 239 (Jones, C.J.) (plurality); Id. at -, 367 A.2d at 249
(Nix, J., concurring). Chief Justice Jones stated: "[W]e believe that the Board made a
good faith determination within the lawful bounds of its discretion that the petition
was defective as a result of the signatures which fell into the 'illegal notarizations'
and 'irregular affidavits' categories." Id. at -, 367 A.2d at 239 (plurality).
, 367 A.2d at 249
69. Id. at , 367 A.2d 239 (Jones, C.J.) (plurality); Id. at (Nix, J., concurring). Justice O'Brien discussed the issue of constitutionality but did
not discuss the sufficiency of the evidence before the Board as it related to whether or
not the Board abused its discretion or acted contrary to law in ruling on that evidence
and invalidating the recall petition. Id. at __, 367 A.2d at 247-49 (O'Brien, J.
concurring). Justice Eagen declined to rule on the sufficiency of the evidence in the
absence of an adversary hearing either before the Board or in the court de novo. Id. at
, 367 A.2d at 257-60 (Eagen, J., dissenting). See note 54 supra. Therefore, only five
of the justices actually resolved this issue, three holding the evidence sufficient to
support the Board's finding and two, Justice Pomeroy and Justice Roberts, finding it
insufficient and concluding that the Board had therefore abused its discretion. See
note 66 supra.
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provision, 70 and the other justices followed his lead, resulting in several
interpretations of the pertinent constitutional provisions.7 1
The Chief Justice interpreted section 7 as mandatory and exclusive for
all constitutional officers. 72 Reading the section as a whole, he interpreted
the first clause that all officers could retain their offices as long as they
behaved well as meaning that they could not be removed unless they
misbehaved. 73 He thus read the third clause to mean that nonconstitutional
elected officers, as well as constitutional officers, may be removed only for
misbehavior, or reasonable cause. 74 Chief Justice Jones acknowledged that
section 1 gave the legislature the power to establish methods of removal for
legislatively created officers, but he declared that this power was subject to
section 7's requirement that reasonable cause accompany removal from
75
office.
Justice Nix, joined by Justice Manderino, interpreted the specific
language of the third clause of section 7 as prevailing over the more general
language of section 1,76 with the result that even nonconstitutional elected
officials could be removed only by the "Governor for reasonable cause, after
' 77
due notice and full hearing, on the address of two-thirds of the Senate.
Justice O'Brien interpreted the legislative authority granted by section 1 to
include the authority to establish conditions for tenure, 78 but insisted that

70. Pa. at -,
367 A.2d at 244 (Jones, C.J.) (plurality). Chief Justice Jones
remarked:
We understand that many Pennsylvania municipalities, boroughs and townships
have or are presently considering the inclusion of recall provisions in their
governing charters, and we would be neglectful of our duty if we did not promptly
rule on this matter. . .. Rather than dashing the hopes and expectations of
citizens around the state who may approve recall proposals only to find, by a later
ruling of this Court, that their actions were to no avail, we prefer to set guidelines
for the future.
Id. Justice Roberts pointed out in his opinion that to decide a constitutional question
when a case could be decided on nonconstitutional grounds was contrary to the
principle followed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: "[T]he basic law of this
jurisdiction [is] that statutes are presumed constitutional, and we will not reach
constitutional issues where the matter can be decided on nonconstitutional grounds."
Id. at -,
367 A.2d at 285 (Roberts, J., dissenting), quoting Lattanzio v.
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 461 Pa. 392, 395, 336 A.2d 595, 597 (1975)
(citations omitted).
71. See notes 72-98 and accompanying text infra.
Pa. at ,367 A.2d at 245 (Jones, C.J.) (plurality). See notes 22 & 25 and
72. accompanying text supra.
, 367 A.2d at 244-45 (Jones, C.J.) (plurality).
73. --- Pa. at 74. Id. at __, 367 A.2d at 245.
75. Id. As all of the decided cases on this issue involved legislation that did
require cause for removal, the Chief Justice noted that his decision was consistent
with prior case law. Id. For Justice Robert's criticism of the Chief Justice's conclusion,
Id. see notes 108-109 and accompanying text infra.
76. -. Pa. at , 367 A.2d at 253 (Nix, J., concurring).
77. Id. at , 367 A.2d at 250-51 quoting PA. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
367 A.2d at 248 (O'Brien, J., concurring), citing Weiss v.
78. Pa. at -,
Zeigler, 327 Pa. 100, 193 A. 642 (1937).
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removal was not such a condition. 79 Therefore, he, too, advocated strict
adherence to the removal provision in the third clause of section 7.80
Justice Eagen, in his dissenting opinion, took exception to Chief Justice
Jones' reading the first clause of section 7 as implying that all officers could
hold office as long as they behaved well. 81 He asserted that to read this as a
sole condition for retaining office would contradict the directive of the
second clause that an appointing power may remove at will.8 2 Justice
Eagen, espousing the view that those who elect an official should be
permitted to recall him "at their pleasure," 83 suggested that the electing
power, the people, should be authorized as fully as appointing powers.84
Referring to the inception of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter in his
dissent, Justice Pomeroy explored the reasons behind the inclusion of the
recall procedure.8 5 He then explained why the court should defer to those
reasons,8 6 relying upon the framers' statement of purposes:
Purposes: 1. The power is vested in the electorate to recall officials
elected by them so that such officials may be directly responsible for
their behavior in office to the electorate. The Charter vests responsibilities of great magnitude in the Mayor, the City Controller and
Councilmen. The electorate is entitled to expect the proper discharge of
those responsibilities and in accordance with promises made when office
was sought, barring changes in circumstances which justify other
courses of action. The power of the electorate to recall should serve as a
spur to elected officials to be faithful to this trust. It is also intended to
serve as an expeditious and effective means for removing from office an
elected official who has failed to sustain such trust. Cf. the impeachment
procedure under the Act of June 25, 1919, P.L. 581, Article IV, Section 9
and the experience thereunder. 87

79.
stated:

- Pa. at

-,

367 A.2d at 248 (O'Brien, J., concurring). Justice O'Brien

While Article VI, Section 1, implies the power to provide for conditions of tenure
for nonconstitutional officers, said conditions cannot include methods of removal,

because Article VI, Sections 6 and 7, specifically enumerate the methods and the
reasons for removal of all civil officers. It is well settled that a conflict between
specific and general provisions in the Constitution will be resolved in favor of the
specific provisions.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis supplied by the court).

80. Id. at -, 367 A.2d at 248-49.
81. Id. at
367 A.2d at 255-56 (Eagen, J., dissenting). See note 73 and
accompanying text supra.
82. Id. at - , 367 A.2d at 256.
83. Id.
84. Id.
-,

85. Id. at

-

, 367 A.2d at 264-66 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).

86. Id.
87. Id. at n.16, 367 A.2d at 266 n.16, quoting 351 PA. CODE § 9.9-100 n.1
(1974). Notes 2-4 of that same section provide:
2. While no charges are required to be lodged formally against an elected
official to subject him to a recall election, it is anticipated on the basis of
experience in other jurisdictions having the recall, that the electorate will exercise
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Justice Pomeroy asserted that the framers' statement of purposes expressed
the wish of the people to "'keep their officers constantly amenable to
popular control.' "88 Recognizing that the constitution declared that "[aill
power is inherent in the people," 89 Justice Pomeroy stressed that "the
decision to seek and obtain recall of an officer is essentially a political one,
and not a matter of judicial intervention." 90
Justice Roberts argued most strenuously for recall as a "traditional
institution in American local government." 91 Never would the framers of the
Philadelphia Home Rule Charter have placed so much power in the hands of
certain officials, he contended, had they not reserved the power of recall to
the people to act as a check and balance on the exercise of those powers. 92 In
an analysis of the constitutional language, Justice Roberts found nothing in
section 7 to support the Chief Justice's interpretation that good behavior
was the exclusive condition for nonconstitutional officers' holding elected
office. 93 He stated that legislatures could create offices under section 1,
condition tenure for those offices in addition to the condition of "behaving
well," and establish methods for removal.94 The third clause of section 7,
according to Justice Roberts, referred to the removal of nonconstitutional
officers only if the Governor attempted to remove them. 9 ' He criticized Chief
Justice Jones' interpretation of the third clause,9 6 contending that if the
third clause is exclusive as to a requirement of reasonable cause, it must also
be exclusive as to the Governor's and the Senate's participation, so that only
97
the Governor and the Senate, not the people, could remove an officeholder.
its power to recall wisely, for good reasons and in accordance with the purposes
and spirit of the recall.
3. Elected officials subject to recall are the Mayor, the City Controller, the
City Treasurer and Councilmen.
4. Officials holding an elective office are subject to recall regardless of the
manner in which they were designated to hold office.
351 PA. CODE § 9.9-100 nn. 2-4.
88. - Pa. at , 367 A.2d at 268 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting), quoting W.
ANDERSON & E. WEIDNER, AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT 333 (Rev. ed. 1950).
89. Pa. at -'
367 A.2d at 265 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting), quoting PA. CONST.
art. I, §2.
90.

-

Pa. at

-'

367 A.2d at 268 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).

91. Id. at -,
367 A.2d at 274-75 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Roberts
emphasized that "[t]he recall power is founded upon the most fundamental principle
of our constitutional system: all power stems from the people." Id. (footnote omitted).
For a brief synopsis of the historical roots of the recall process, see 48 WASH. L. REV.
503, 505 n.6 (1973).
92. -. Pa. at -, 367 A.2d at 276-77 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Roberts
reasoned that "[t]he opinions striking down recall distort the Charter into a one-sided
grant of power to the government without accompanying voter control over the
exercise of those powers. . . . Invalidating recall undermines the principal objectives
of the Charter and abrogates the right of the people to control their city government."
Id.
93. Id. at _ , 367 A.2d at 287. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
94. Pa. at -, 367 A.2d at 288-89 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at __, 367 A.2d at 287. By reading the third clause this way, Justice
Roberts recognized that it is mandatory, but suggested that "mandatory" does not
mean "exclusive." Id. at - n.41, 367 A.2d at 293 n.41.
96. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
97. Pa. at -, 367 A.2d at 287 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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Justice Roberts viewed this as an unjustifiable reading of the third clause,
arguing that the "reasonable cause" requirement conditions only the
governor's removal powers - "[i]t bears no relation to the voters' right to
recall." 98
As a result of the justices' examination of the relevant constitutional
provisions, three methods of interpretation emerged which provide the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania with little direction. Justices Manderino,
Nix and O'Brien adopted a method of strict textual analysis, reading the
constitution for the literal meaning of the words. 99 Relying on Pennsylvania
Supreme Court cases which had applied another method in construing the
language now before the court, 100 Justices Eagen, Pomeroy and Roberts
looked at the constitution and the statutes - the Philadelphia Home Rule
Charter, the Local Agency Law, and the Notary Public Law - as reflecting
the intent of the framers and the legislators and read the words as an
embodiment of that intent.101 Justice Roberts further argued that the
framers of the constitution wanted to protect constitutional officers and
therefore the constitution provided the exclusive method for removing such
officers. 10 2 He felt, however, that no such protection was intended for the
occupants of legislatively created offices. 10 3 Chief Justice Jones adopted
neither a strict method of interpretation nor one embodying the intent of the
framers. Rather, he looked at the historical perspective and noting that all
98. Id.
99. Id. at -, 367 A.2d at 250-51 (Nix, J., concurring); Id. at , 367 A.2d at
248-49 (O'Brien, J., concurring). Because such an interpretation would be contrary to
prior Pennsylvania cases, the three justices (Manderino joining with Nix) believed the
holding in Milford Township Supervisors' Removal, 291 Pa. 46, 139 A. 623 (1927),
should be overruled. Id. at -,
367 A.2d at 253-54 (Nix, J., concurring); Id. at -,
367 A.2d at 248 (O'Brien, J., concurring). For a discussion of Milford, see notes 23 & 47
and accompanying text and text accompanying notes 43-47 supra.
Consistent with their method of constitutional interpretation, Justices
Manderino and Nix strictly construed the Notary Public Law as it affected the
affidavit requirement of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter. -- Pa. at , 367
A.2d at 249 (Nix, J., concurring).
100. Id. at , 367 A.2d 255-57 (Eagen, J., dissenting); Id. at -, 367 A.2d at
262-64 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting); Id. at __, 367 A.2d at 293-99 (Roberts, J.,
dissenting), citing Watson v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'rs, 386 Pa. 117,125 A.2d
354 (1956); Commonwealth ex rel. Bunch v. Beattie, 364 Pa. 572, 73 A.2d 664 (1950); In
re Marshall, 360 Pa. 304, 62 A.2d 30 (1948); Weiss v. Zeigler, 327 Pa. 100, 193 A. 642
(1937); Commonwealth ex rel. Smillie v. McElwee, 327 Pa. 148, 193 A. 628 (1937);
Milford Township Supervisors' Removal, 291 Pa. 46, 139 A. 623 (1927); Vesneski v.
Reid, 265 Pa. 328, 108 A. 829 (1919); Richie v. Philadelphia, 225 Pa. 511, 74 A. 430
(1909); In re Bowman, 225 Pa. 364, 74 A. 203 (1909); Commonwealth v. Moir, 199 Pa.
534, 49 A. 351 (1901); Commonwealth ex rel. Braughler v. Weir, 165 Pa. 284, 30 A. 835
(1895); Commonwealth v. McCombs, 56 Pa. 436 (1867).
101. Id. at , 367 A.2d at 254-60 (Eagen, J., dissenting); Id. at -, 367 A.2d at
260-73 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting); Id. at -, 367 A.2d at 273-99 (Roberts, J.,
dissenting). Similarly, in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence before the Board,
Justice Pomeroy and Justice Roberts relied on the legislative intent behind certain
statutes rather than on the technical language of the statutes themselves. Id. at __,
367 A.2d at 270-73 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting); Id. at -, 367 A.2d at 277-84 (Roberts,
J., dissenting).
102.

-

Pa. at

__,

367 A.2d at 295 (Roberts, J., dissenting).

103. Id.
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legislatively created methods of removal had been for cause, reasoned that
"cause" was constitutionally required for removal.'0 4
A flaw in the strict interpretation method, according to Justice Eagen,
was the inconsistency between the first and second clauses of section 7 if
both are read literally. 10 5 For instance, could an appointing power remove, at
his pleasure, an officer who was behaving well in office?
Another problem with the strict constructionist theory is that the case
law had been absolutely contrary to such an interpretation.' 0 6 When the
Pennsylvania constitution was readopted in 1966, the members of that
constitutional convention did not change the wording of the removal section
even though they were aware that it had been interpreted by the courts as
distinguishing between constitutional and unconstitutional officers.' 0 7 Had
they desired to change the judicial interpretation of that section, they could
have done so by stating specifically that the section was applicable to and
exclusive for all officers, including those legislatively created.
Justice Roberts disagreed with Chief Justice Jones' approach and
observed that the existence of removal for cause in all cases upholding
legislative removal procedures is not prima facie evidence that "cause" is
required by the constitution. 108 Moreover, the Chief Justice's reasoning
directly conflicts with the doctrine espoused by Justice O'Brien that
"[s]tatutes which attempt to legislate in areas covered by the Constitution
must meet the test of the Constitution rather than the Constitution meeting
the text of the statutes."'0 9
Although there can be little doubt that the recall provision in the
Philadelphia Home Rule Charter is unconstitutional according to the
present Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the court's reaction to other recall
provisions in local government charters across the state is uncertain."10
Three justices would declare them unconstitutional per se;"' one would

104. Id. at __, 367 A.2d at 245-46 (Jones, C.J.) (plurality). Unlike his approach to
the constitution, the Chief Justice's statutory analysis was one of strict and narrow
interpretation, a method he applied consistently when he construed the Philadelphia
Home Rule Charter, the Local Agency Law, and the Notary Public Law. Id. at __,
367 A.2d at 235-43.
105. Id. at __, 367 A.2d at 256 (Eagen, J., dissenting). See notes 81-82 and
accompanying text supra.
106. __ Pa. at -.
367 A.2d at 296-98 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at n.50, 367 A.2d at 298 n.50.
108. Justice Roberts said of these cases:
Nothing in these cases suggests that this Court upheld these legislative removal
procedures because they required cause. The Opinion of the Chief Justice infers
the constitutional necessity for cause from the mere fact that the Legislature has
heretofore chosen. alternatives which required cause. The error in the Chief
Justice's reasoning lies in his assumption that because legislative schemes have
provided for removal for cause, cause is constitutionally mandated.
Id. at __, 367 A.2d at 290 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at __, 367 A.2d at 249 (O'Brien, J., concurring).
110. Justice Roberts reported that twenty-three cities and townshipsin Pennsylvania have charters with recall provisions and that six counties have such provisions in
their recommended charters. Id. at

-,

367 A.2d at 274 (Roberts, J., dissenting).

111. See notes 76-80 and accompanying text supra.
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require reasonable cause for removal; 1 2 and three would probably uphold
their constitutionality.'1 3 Thus, a well-written recall provision requiring
reasonable cause for removal would probably withstand a constitutional
attack by a four to three vote in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court if the
reasonable cause alleged related to the officeholder's misbehavior in office.
Whether local governments feel this is a sufficient guideline to enable them
to pass, repeal, or modify recall legislation will be reflected in their action or
inaction in response to this opinion. At least one state newsletter has
cautioned local officials to postpone any action pending clarification of the
1 14
guidelines the Chief Justice purported to establish.
It is difficult to determine whether the invalidation of the Philadelphia
recall provision will encourage local officials to engage in self-serving
conduct, or whether it will free those officials from the "sword of
Damocles"115 hanging over their heads, enabling them to perform more
responsibly and energetically for the people." 6 Local municipalities,
hesitant to write recall provisions into their charters, may refrain from
granting necessary powers to their officers, fearful that the officers might
abuse their power while enjoying virtual immunity from removal except by
7
the cumbersome process of impeachment."
Due to the court's decided split on the removal issue, the outcome of
future litigation, assuming no change in the justices' positions, is uncertain.
Since the Chief Justice recently retired from the court, the newly elected
justice will undoubtedly be the swing vote on future resolutions of recall

112. See notes 72-75 and accompanying text supra.
113. See notes 81-98 and accompanying text supra.
114. 1 HOME RULE NEWSLETTER 2-3 (December, 1976) (published
Community Affairs of the Commw. of Pa.). The article states that
course of action for home rule charter municipalities, however, is to
until the 'dust clears' on this matter, and this will take some time."
115.

-

Pa. at

by the Dep't of
"[tihe sensible
take no action
Id. at 3.

-, 367 A.2d at 246 (Jones, C.J.) (plurality), quoting Appeal of

Foltz, 370 Pa. 567, 572, 88 A.2d 871, 873 (1952) (emphasis supplied by the court
omitted).
116. The author of a recent law review article commented on the process of recall
as it related to a proposed constitutional amendment in the state of Utah:
A compelling policy objection to the proposal as a whole is that it has a
distrustful thrust not conducive to entry into public service by able individuals of
independent spirit and lively sensibilities. Were the measure adopted it would
provide a ready weapon for attack upon a public officer at public expense for
whatever reason. What is of primary importance is a constitutional scheme and a
political climate that are congenial to public service by individuals of highest
quality.
Fordham, The Utah Recall Proposal, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 29, 33.
Fearing the detrimental effect of recall without cause, another author
commented on the state of Washington's constitutional provision:
Recall should not serve as a device to remove politically unpopular elective
officers, or to voice disapproval of unpopular but otherwise legal decisions or acts
in which elective officers have participated. Use of the recall process should be
limited solely to removal of a wrongdoer from elective office.
Cohen, Recall in Washington: A Time for Reform, 50 WASH. L. Rav. 29, 54-55 (1974).
117. See note 90 and accompanying text supra.
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issues. Thus, the validity of any form of recall provision that provides for
the removal of nonconstitutional elected public officials will have to be
decided in another case.
Madeline H. Lamb

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

SEARCH AND SEIZURE - DOES INSTALLATION
OF AN ELECTRONIC TRACKING DEVICE CONSTITUTE A SEARCH SUBJECT
TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects the
privacy' of the individual by prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures
while requiring that a warrant for a search or seizure shall issue only upon
probable cause. 2 Modem technology has now enabled law enforcement
agencies to utilize electronic surveillance devices 3 which were unknown to
the framers of our Constitution and which raise difficult questions as to the
applicability of the fourth amendment to control their use. This note shall
focus upon whether the placement and use of an electronic tracking device,
or "beeper,"' 4 constitutes a "search" within the meaning of the fourth
amendment.

1. For a discussion of privacy and the fourth amendment, see, e.g., Clark,
Constitutional Sources of the Penumbral Right to Privacy, 19 VILL. L. REV. 833,
862-66 (1974); Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L. J. 475 (1968); Rehnquist, Is an Expanded
Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair and Effective Law Enforcement? Or: Privacy,
You've Come a Long Way, Baby, 23 KAN. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1974); Westin, Science,
Privacy, and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970's, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1003,
1205 (1966); Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of
Fourth Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 968 (1968).
2. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The determination of whether probable cause exists for a search must "be
judged against an objective standard: Would the facts available to the officer at the
moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that the action taken was appropriate?" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1967).
For a discussion of the relationship between the warrant and reasonableness
clause of the fourth amendment, see Player, WarrantlessSearches and Seizures, 5 GA.
L. REV. 269, 270-71 (1971).
3. See Note, Anthropotelemetry: Dr. Schwitzgebel's Machine, 80 HARv L REV.
403 (1966).
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In answering this question, this note will begin with a brief discussion
of the seminal case of Katz v. United States,5 which established a
"reasonable expectation of privacy" standard to govern the scope of fourth
amendment protection. Since the circuits are divided on the "beeper"
question,' the various judicial results will then be analyzed. The differing
judicial approaches to the "beeper" issue will also be discussed and
compared to the somewhat analogous contexts of the vehicle identification
number,8 paint scraping.and tire tread cases. 9
II.

BACKGROUND

The Supreme Court of the United States originally limited fourth
amendment protection to those searches which involved an actual trespass
and to those seizures which comprised the taking of material objects. 10 This
"trespass doctrine""' required the physical intrusion to be in a "constitutionally protected area"' 2 - as in a house or office. 13 This doctrine was expressly
4. The beeper is not a recording device nor does it transmit conversation; rather,

it allows discovery of the location of the object to which the beeper is attached by
emitting a signal which can be monitored by a radio receiver. United States v. Emery,
541 F.2d 887, 888 n.1 (1st Cir. 1976).
5. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
6. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
7. Compare United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976) (installation of a beeper is a search within
the fourth amendment) with United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 36 (9th Cir. 1976)
(opposite conclusion). The First and Eighth Circuits have expressly declined to decide
the question. United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887, 888-90 (1st Cir. 1976); United
States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322, 1323-25 (8th Cir. 1976).
8. See notes 24-26 and accompanying text infra. Two circuits have held a
warrantless search to obtain a vehicle identification number [VIN] to be violative of
the fourth amendment. United States v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966);
Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1965). In contrast, other circuits
have concluded that such an inspection does not constitute a search. United States v.
Graham, 391 F.2d 439 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1035 (1968); Weaver v. United
States, 374 F.2d 878 (5th Cir. 1967); Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385 (9th Cir.
1967). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Powers, 439
F.2d 373 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1011 (1971), held such a warrantless
inspection to be a search subject to the requirements of the fourth amendment. Id. at
374-76. However, the Powers court concluded that so long as there was a legitimate
reason to justify the inspection, it was a reasonable search, and evidence derived
therefrom was admissible. Id.
9. See notes 89-96 and accompanying text infra.
10. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). In Olmstead, the fourth
amendment was held not to extend to intangibles such as conversation. Id. at 464-66.
Consequently, the Court held that the use of a wiretap to overhear conversation was
not a search since there was no physical trespass into the houses or offices of the
defendants. Id. The "trespass doctrine" was subsequently followed in Goldman v.
United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1942) (use of a "detectaphone" to monitor
conversations did not violate the fourth amendment in the absence of a physical
trespass).
11. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928).
12. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1960). For a discussion of
Silverman, see note 13 infra.
13. United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 314-16 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J.
dissenting), affl'd, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). When a physical intrusion into a "constitutionally protected area" occurred, a fourth amendment violation was found although only
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repudiated in Katz v. United States14 where the Supreme Court shifted from
an emphasis upon protected places to an emphasis upon an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy. In Katz, F.B.I. agents, acting without a
warrant, attached a listening device to the outside of a public telephone
booth in order to overhear the suspect's conversations." The Supreme Court
held that such nontrespassory eavesdropping constituted a "search and
seizure" under the fourth amendment 6 because it "violated the privacy upon
which [Katz] justifiably relied while using the telephone booth .... 1 In
rejecting the notion of "constitutionally protected areas,"1 " the Court
stressed that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places"'19 and that
what a person "seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected."2
In Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz, he articulated a dual
standard for ascertaining what governmental conduct constitutes a search
in terms of an individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy." This
formulation has subsequently been adopted as the test to determine the
fourth amendment's applicability. It was Justice Harlan's understanding
"that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation
be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "21 It is wellestablished that a balance must be struck between the government's interest
words had been seized. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961). In
Silverman, a "spike mike" was pushed through the wall of an adjoining house until it

contacted a heating duct on the defendant's premises, allowing the officers to
overhear conversations in the house occupied by the defendant. Id. at 506-07. The
Court held such an intrusion to be violative of the fourth amendment. Id. at 509-12.
After Silverman, the exclusionary rule was extended to bar the use of verbal evidence
obtained as the result of an unlawful invasion in violation of the fourth amendment.
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963).
14. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Both Olmstead and Goldman (see note 10 supra) were
overruled and the requirement of an actual trespass "there enunciated can no longer
be regarded as controlling." 389 U.S. at 353.
15. Id. at 348.
16. Id. at 353.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 351.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 351 (citations omitted).
21. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J. concurring). For a discussion of Katz and Mr. Justice
Harlan's formulation of the rule, see, e.g., Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 384-88, "403 (1974); Note, supra note 1, at 982-84.
As the probable result of the Supreme Court's decisions in Katz and Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (New York's statute permitting eavesdropping declared

unconstitutional), Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act

of 1968, tit. III, ch. 19, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970). The provisions of the Act restrict
the use of electronic surveillance in regard to the interception of wire and oral
communications. For a discussion of Title III, see, e.g., Schwartz, The Legitimation of
Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and Order", 67 MICH. L. REV. 455
(1969); Comment, Electronic Surveillance: The New Standards,35 BROOKLYN L. REV.
49 (1968); Note, Electronic Intelligence Gathering and the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 331 (1975); Note, Wiretapping and
Electronic Surveillance - Title III of the Crime Control Act of 1968, 23 RUTGERS L.
REV. 319, 326 (1969).
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in obtaining necessary information and the individual's "right of personal
'22
security, personal liberty and private property.
Certain activities by law enforcement agents have been determined not
to attain the level of a search so as to require compliance with the fourth
amendment. For example, the taking of paint scrapings from a car or
examining tire treads for identification comparisons without a warrant has
been held not to violate any reasonable expectation of privacy. 23 Similarly,
the warrantless examination of an automobile for its vehicle identification
number (VIN) has been ruled not to be a search by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, 24 while an opposite
conclusion has been reached by the Seventh and Tenth Circuits. 25 The
Fourth Circuit has taken the position that such an inspection is a search but
may be justified without a warrant when there is a legitimate reason to
26
identify a motor vehicle.
The Fifth and the Ninth Circuits, in cases discussed below, are in
disagreement over whether the attachment of "beepers" to a vehicle for the
purpose of tracking its location constitutes a search subject to fourth
amendment limitations.
III.

FIFTH

CIRCUIT'S

DECISION IN United States v. Holmes

In United States v. Holmes, 27 defendants were charged with conspiracy
and possession with intent to distribute marijuana. 28 While a government
22. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
23. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591-92 (1974); for a discussion of Cardwell,

see note 53 and accompanying text infra.

24. United States v. Johnson, 413 F.2d 1396, 1399-1400 (5th Cir. 1969), aff'd en
banc, 431 F.2d 441 (1970) (per curiam) (inspection of identification numbers was not a
search); United States v. Graham, 391 F.2d 439, 442-43 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1035 (1968) (examination of automobile properly in police custody was not a
search thereof); Weaver v. United States, 374 F.2d 878, 882 (5th Cir. 1967) (opening
door to examine VIN was not a search); Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385 (9th Cir.
1967) (opening car door to check serial number while car was in police custody was
not a search). In Cotton and Johnson, the courts alternatively held that if such
inspections did constitute a search, they were reasonable searches which did not
violate the fourth amendment. Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d at 392; United States
v. Johnson, 413 F.2d at 1400. See also United States v. Wood, 500 F.2d 681 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1011 (1971); United States v. Williams, 434 F.2d 681 (5th
Cir. 1970); United States v. Polk, 433 F.2d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1970) (examination of VIN
on rear axle is outside any reasonable expectation of privacy).
25. United States v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 1966) (warrantless
search disclosing serial numbers violated the fourth amendment); Simpson v. United
States, 346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1965) (warrantless search for vehicle identification
numbers held unconstitutional).
26. United States v. Powers, 439 F.2d 373, 374-76 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
1011 (1971).
27. 521 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd en banc by an equally divided court, 537
F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976).
28. A grand jury returned an indictment against all nine appellees and two other
persons. 521 F.2d at 863. They were all charged with conspiracy in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846 (1970), and six appellees were indicted on the possession count. Id.
§ 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
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agent was discussing the purchase with Holmes, another agent, acting
without a warrant, attached an electronic beeper to the exterior of Holmes'
van while the vehicle was located in a public parking lot.2 9 The defendants
filed motions to suppress3 ° evidence obtained from a subsequent search of
the van and other property, contending that because the agents conducted
an illegal search in the attachment of the beeper in violation of the fourth
amendment, 31 the evidence so procured constituted "fruit of the poisonous
tree."3 2 The government argued that a citizen does not have a reasonable

expectation of privacy in a vehicle left on a public parking lot or driven on
public roads, and therefore the installation of the tracking device was not a
search because the defendant's privacy was not invaded. 33 The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Florida suppressed the
evidence, holding that the installation of the beeper was an illegal search.3 1
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed, 35 and on rehearing en banc, this decision was upheld by an
36
equally divided court.
The Fifth Circuit 37 began its inquiry into whether the attachment of the

beeper to Holmes' van was an illegal search by stating that the fourth
amendment, in light of Katz, extends protection to a citizen from
unreasonable governmental intrusion into the privacy of his life.3 8 The court
formulated this threshold question as being whether the government had
invaded the individual's "right of personal security, personal liberty and
private property"3 9 and had thus violated "the privacy upon which he
justifiably relied." 40 In applying the Katz standard to the instant case, the
court noted that, contrary to the Government's contentions, an individual
does not relinquish all expectations of privacy in his vehicle when it is

29. 521 F.2d at 861. An undercover agent met Holmes in a lounge in Gainesville,
Florida for the purpose of displaying to Holmes the cash required to consummate the
purchase of 300 pounds of marijuana. Id. While this meeting was taking place,
another agent attached the beeper under the right rear wheel of Holmes' vehicle. Id.
30. Pursuant to Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, all nine
appellees moved to suppress the evidence which consisted- of 1200 pounds of
marijuana found in defendant's van and another 1200 pounds of marijuana and
related paraphernalia found in a house and a shed on the defendants' property. 521
F.2d at 862-63.
31. 521 F.2d at 863.
32. Id. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963). (verbal evidence
may be excluded as the fruit of official illegality as well as more tangible fruits of
illegal intrusions)
33. 521 F.2d at 864.
34. Id. at 861.

35. Id. Although the Fifth Circuit affirmed as to the illegality of the search, id., it
reversed the holding of the district court that all the defendants had standing to
challenge the installation and use of the beeper. Id. at 870-72.
36. 537 F.2d 227 (1976).
37. Circuit Judge Simpson wrote the majority opinion.
38. 521 F.2d at 864.
39. Id. at 865, citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); for a
discussion of Boyd, see note 22 and accompanying text supra.
40. 521 F.2d at 865, citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); for a
discussion of Katz, see notes 14-21 and accompanying text supra.
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parked on a public lot or driven on public roads. 41 The Fifth Circuit stated
that this expectation includes the right to presume that the police will not
attach a tracking device to his car in order to trace his movements when he
drives his vehicle in areas accessible to the public. 42 The Government's
contention that probable cause existed to justify the installation was
43
similarly rejected.
The court distinguished the present case from those involving the
checking of vehicle identification numbers, 44 the comparison of tire treads,
or the taking of paint scrapings. The majority viewed the latter situations as
45
involving intrusions of only limited scope, purpose and duration.
46
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's decision in Katz was found to be
controlling and the Fifth Circuit noted no distinction between the violation
of privacy which was held to occur in Katz when a tap was placed on a
phone booth to overhear conversations, 47 and the installation of a tracking
device on a van to trace its movement. 48 Therefore, the court held that the
attachment of the beeper was a search, 49 and that the agents' failure to
obtain a warrant made that search unreasonable and a violation of the
fourth amendment.

50

In contrast, Judge Ainsworth, writing for the dissent from the Fifth
Circuit's en banc affirmance, viewed the installation of the tracking device'
51
as not constituting a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment.

41. 521 F.2d at 864.
42. Id. at 866. The Court expressed concern that if the warrantless installation of
the beeper in the instant case was held not to be within the protection of the fourth
amendment, then "there is nothing to forestall the implanting of a similar device on
one's person, and this on no greater grounds than existed in the present case: the
merest of suspicions."Id.
43. Id. The court impliedly accepted the determination of the district judge that at
the time of the installation of the beeper, the agents did not possess any information
that the van had been or was to be used in the transportation of marijuana. Id.
Furthermore, the trial judge concluded that an application for a warrant at the time
the beeper was attached would have been denied for lack of probable cause. Id. at 863.
44. See notes 24-26 and accompanying text supra.
45. 521 F.2d at 865. The Government relied on United States v. Polk, 433 F.2d 644
(5th Cir. 1970) and United States v. Johnson, 413 F.2d 1396 (5th Cir. 1969), aff'd en
banc, 431 F.2d 441 (1970). For a discussion of these cases, see note 24 and
accompanying text supra. The Fifth Circuit found these cases inapposite because the
beeper used in Holmes was in operation for over 42 hours and involved more than a
limited intrusion on the privacy of the individual. 521 F.2d at 866 n.14.
46. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see notes 24-26 and accompanying
text supra.

47. 389 U.S. at 353.
48. 521 F.2d at 865. The government sought to distinguish Katz from the instant
case on the ground that the phone tap at issue in Katz overheard and recorded
conversation, an area in which, the Government claimed, the individual has an
"extraordinary expectation of privacy." Id.
49. Id. at 864.
50. Id. at 864, 867. The government did not contend that any exceptions to the
warrant requirement were applicable in order to justify the warrantless search. Id. at
867 n.15.
51. 537 F.2d at 228 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977

31

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 5 [1977], Art. 4

1976-1977]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

1073

54
Citing the vehicle identification, 2 paint scraping 53 and other beeper cases,
the dissent considered the installation of the beeper to be only a minimal
intrusion upon the defendant's expectation of privacy.55 Moreover, in the
view of the dissenting judges, Katz was inapposite to the instant case
because the beeper did not intercept conversation but merely transmitted the
vehicle's location. 56 Therefore, the dissent concluded, the Government's
action in attaching the tracking device was not al illegal search for failure to
comply with the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. 57 Alternatively, even if attachment of the beeper were a search, the dissent concluded
that placement was justified without a warrant under a determination of
58
either reasonable suspicion or probable cause.

IV.

THE REACTION TO

Holmes

IN THE NINTH AND OTHER CIRCUITS

In United States v. Hufford,59 defendants were convicted of possession
with intent to distribute amphetamines.6° Hufford ordered two large drums
of caffeine used in the manufacture of amphetamines from a chemical
52. The dissent relied upon cases holding an inspection of a car to determine its
vehicle identification number to be reasonable and not violative of the fourth
amendment. 537 F.2d at 230 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting), citing United States v.
Johnson, 431 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1970) (en banc).
53. Id. at 229-30. In Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), the Supreme Court
held that the warrantless examination of the exterior of defendant's automobile upon
probable cause to obtain paint samples was reasonable and did not infringe any
expectation of privacy that the requirement of a search warrant was meant to protect.
417 U.S. at 591-92. For a further discussion of Cardwell, see notes 89-96 and
accompanying text infra and United States v. Polk, 433 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1976).
54. Use of an electronic tracking device was upheld by the Fifth Circuit in United
States v. Bishop, 530 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1976) (use of beeper by bank officials in a
packet of "bait" money) and United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1976)
(beeper placed in television set which police bartered for heroin with). See also United
States v. Carpenter, 403 F. Supp. 361, 364-65 (D. Mass. 1975) (beeper placed in
package of cocaine by custom agents acting without a warrant did not violate the
fourth amendment).
55. 537 F.2d at 229 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 231.
57. Id. at 228.
58. Id. at 228-29. The dissent viewed the meeting between Holmes and the agent,
at which time the money for the marijuana purchase was displayed, as forming a
"reasonable basis for placing the beeper on the van then 'situated in the public
parking lot of the lounge." Id. at 229.
The dissent also found the exigent circumstances sufficient to qualify for an
exception to the warrant requirement because Holmes was about to depart to
consummate the narcotics transaction, and "[t]he agents did not know when they
might have another chance, if at all, to install the beeper on the vehicle." Id. For cases
which develop the well-defined exceptions to the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment, see, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-73 (1971) (plain
view doctrine); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to an arrest);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298300 (1967) (hot pursuit); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 152, 156 (1925)
(automobile exception). See also Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of
Automobiles, 87 HARV. L. REV. 835, 835-37 (1974).
59. 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1976).
60. Martyniuk and Hufford were both charged with violating.21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(1970). United States v. Martyniuk, 395 F. Supp. 42 (D. Oregon 1975), aff'd in part,

rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1976).
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company. 61 Government agents, acting without a warrant but with the
consent of the company, installed an electronic tracking device in one of the
drums. 62 After Hufford picked up the caffeine drums, agents followed him to
63
a rented garage by relying on the signal emitted by the beeper.
Subsequently, the agents obtained a search warrant, entered the premises
and seized a variety of drug paraphernalia.86 The defendants filed motions
to suppress the evidence,65 contending that the agents invaded their
constitutional right to privacy by placing the beeper in the drum without
obtaining a search warrant.66 The United States District Court for the
District of Oregon agreed with this contention with regard to Hufford and
granted the motion. 67 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed, holding that the fourth amendment was not violated since
there had been no infringement upon the defendants' reasonable expectation
68

of privacy.
The Ninth Circuit, in finding that the agents' activity of installing the
beeper did not constitute an illegal search, acknowledged that it reached an
opposite conclusion from the Fifth Circuit's decision in Holmes.69 The court
reasoned that as long as the drum was in the control of the chemical
company, Hufford had no reasonable expectation of privacy concerning it.7o
The Ninth Circuit then concluded that once Hufford had possession, "his
movements were knowingly exposed to the public, and therefore [were] not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection."' 71 The decision in Hufford has
61. 539 F.2d at 33.
62. Id.
63. Id. The district court concluded that but for the beeper, the agents could not
have ascertained the location of the garage. Id. at 34.
64. Id. at 33.
65. The motions were filed pursuant to Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. United States v. Martyniuk, 395 F. Supp. 42, 43 (D. Oregon 1975), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part sub noma. United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1976).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 44-45. The district court, concluding that Martyniuk lacked standing to
contest the installation of the beeper because he had no pdssessory interest in the
drum, denied his motion. Id. at 46.
68. United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 33 (9th Cir. 1976). The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the conviction of defendant Martyniuk. Id. at 35.
69. Id. at 33 n.1. The Ninth Circuit also noted that the Fifth Circuit was then in
the process of rehearing Holmes en banc. Id.
70. Id. at 34.
71. Id. at 33-34, citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). The Ninth
Circuit also relied upon Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (see note 53 supra) in
support of this proposition. There, the Supreme Court had stated:
One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is
transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of
personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels
public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view.
539 F.2d at 34, quoting 417 U.S. at 590. See notes 89-96 and accompanying text supra.
The court also noted that since there was no fourth amendment violation when the
beeper was installed, there was no distinction between the use of the tracking device
as opposed to visual surveillance in following Hufford once he had acquired the drum.
539 F.2d at 34. The Hufford court stated that "[tlhe electronic beeper was merely a
more reliable means of ascertaining where Hufford was going as he drove along the
public road." Id. at 34-35.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977

33

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 5 [1977], Art. 4

1976-1977]

1075

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

been followed by the Ninth Circuit with respect to the attachment of an
72
electronic tracking device to an airplane.
The First and Eighth Circuits have likewise been confronted with the
question of whether the warrantless use of a beeper constitutes an illegal
search but they have not, as yet, squarely resolved the issue. The Eighth
Circuit upheld the attachment of a tracking device without a warrant in
United States v. Frazier.73 In concluding that the intrusion was justified by
exigent circumstances and probable cause, that court did not decide whether
74
the installation itself was a search within the fourth amendment.
Similarly, in United States v. Emery, 75 the First Circuit upheld as
constitutional a warrantless insertion of a beeper into packages containing
cocaine. 76 This court distinguished Holmes on the ground that a defendant
cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband and
therefore did not indicate whether the First Circuit would follow Holmes in
77
an appropriate case.
V. AN

ANALYSIS

OF THE

Holmes

AND

Hufford

OPINIONS

The split between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits results from a
disagreement over whether the warrantless installation of a beeper is a
search within the scope of the fourth amendment. As set forth by Mr. Justice
Harlan's concurrence in Katz, 78 the test to be applied in determining the

extent of fourth amendment protection is whether an individual has
exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy, and whether this
expectation would be recognized as reasonable by society. 79 The majority in
Holmes concluded that a person may reasonably expect that the police will
not attach a beeper to his car to trace his movements when he drives his
vehicle in public.80 While the Fifth Circuit did acknowledge that what a
72. United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1976). In Pretzinger,the

Ninth Circuit held that "[u]nder the law of this circuit... attachment of an electronic
location device to a vehicle moving about on public thoroughfares (or through the
public airspace) does not infringe upon any reasonable expectation of privacy and
therefore does not constitute a search." Id. at 520 (citation omitted). In this specific
case, however, a magistrate had issued an order permitting the installation of the
beeper to the defendant's plane. Id. at 519.
73. 538 F.2d 1322, 1323-25 (8th Cir. 1976).
74. Id. at 1324. In Frazier,FBI agents were investigating an extortion plan which
endangered the life of an unknown individual. Id. at 1325. The agents had sufficient
facts concerning the defendant's involvement to establish probable cause for the
attachment of the beeper to his vehicle. Id. Moreover, since the scheme was to be
executed the morning after the agents uncovered it, the court viewed this situation as
supplying exigent circumstances for the immediate installation of the tracking device.

Id.
75. 541 F.2d 887 (1st Cir. 1976).

76. Id. at 890.

77. Id. at 889-90.
78. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see notes 14-21 and accompanying
text supra.
79. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J. concurring); see notes 14-21 and accompanying
text supra. See also United States v. Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554, 557-58 (1st Cir. 1976);
Ouimette v. Howard, 468 F.2d 1363 (1st Cir. 1972).
80. 521 F.2d at 866.
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person knowingly exposes to the public is not normally protected by the
fourth amendment,"' the court noted that there is no way in which a citizen
can place his vehicle "under a protective cloak as a signal to police that one
considers the car private."8 2 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Hufford
reasoned that an individual has no right to expect his movements to remain
private when he drives along a public road. 3
It is submitted that a citizen has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his movements - that he should be free from warrantless electronic
surveillance. If Katz were to be limited to the area of conversation, as the
dissenting justices in Holmes maintained, the average citizen could take
little solace in the fact that while his conversations were not recorded, his
every movement was being monitored. A balance must be drawn between
the needs of government and the rights of the individual.8 4 The approach of
the Fifth Circuit furthers this goal. Under it, law enforcement agents would
not be denied the use of beepers; rather, fourth amendment restrictions
would be imposed upon their installation.85 The individual's right of privacy
would also be protected since a neutral magistrate, rather than a police
officer or government agent, would determine whether probable cause
86
existed to justify attachment of the tracking device.
The decision in Holmes appears to be consistent with the cases which
have held that there is not a search when a policeman inspects a car for its
vehicle identification number (VIN).87 In such a situation, the invasion of
the individual's privacy is minimal, since the intrusion is limited in scope
and duration. Moreover, a citizen may not be entitled to harbor a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the secrecy of these numbers, due to the quasipublic nature of the VIN and the need of the government to check the VIN
88
expeditiously before the automobile is moved.

81. Id. at 864, quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
82. Id. at 865.
83. 539 F.2d at 33-34.
84. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 388-403; Knox, Some Thoughts on the
Scope of the Fourth Amendment and Standing to Challenge Searches and Seizures, 40
Mo. L. REV. 1 (1975).
85. United States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334, 1339 (D. Mass. 1976).
86. By classifying installation of a tracking device as a search, fourth
amendment protection would be afforded the individual. As stated by Mr. Justice
Jackson:
[The fourth amendment's] protection consists in requiring that those inferences
[which can be drawn] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime .... When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of
search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman ....
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (footnote omitted).
87. See note 45 and accompanying text supra. Presumably, the Seventh and
Tenth Circuits, which have held that a warrantless inspection of a vehicle for its
identification numbers was a search (see note 25 and accompanying text supra)would
conclude that attachment of a beeper is likewise a search since it involves an even
greater intrusion into an individual's expectation of privacy.
88. United States v. Powers, 439 F.2d 373, 375-76 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
1011 (1971).
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Whether Holmes can be reconciled with the 1974 Supreme Court case of

Cardwell v. Lewis, 89 which held that the obtaining of paint scrapings from

the exterior of defendant's vehicle without a warrant is not an illegal
search, 90 is more troublesome. The activity in Cardwell was confined to
scraping paint and examining tire treads; a limited intrusion which was
based upon probable cause.9 1 In contrast, the beeper used in Holmes was in
92
operation for 42 hours and probable cause did not exist for its installation.
These factual distinctions could justify the divergent results. However, the
Cardwell Court relied upon a line of cases represented by Carroll v. United
States93 which permit warrantless automobile searches if exigent circumstances and probable cause exist, 94 to further conclude that a citizen was
entitled to a lesser expectation of privacy in a vehicle than in a home or
office.95 It is submitted that the Cardwell Court merged two separate issues
by relying upon the automobile exception to the warrant requirement to
support its finding that a person enjoys a lesser expectation of privacy in a
motor vehicle. 96 The threshold question should be whether a search has
occurred under Katz: it is only after a person's reasonable expectation of
privacy is determined to have been violated that consideration need be given
to whether an exception to the warrant requirement is applicable. 97 The
Holmes majority correctly separated these issues so that the determination
of whether a search had occurred was resolved before the court examined the
possible applicability of any exceptions to the warrant requirement of the
98
fourth amendment.
As acknowledged by the Fifth Circuit in Holmes, certain governmental
intrusions do not constitute searches due to their minimal invasion upon a
citizen's right to privacy. 99 It is also settled by the great weight of authority
that a citizen does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy to be free
89. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
90. Id. at 591-92. The Ninth Circuit in Hufford cited to Cardwell as support for its
position. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
91. 417 U.S. at 586, 592.
92. 521 F.2d at 863 n.7, 866.
93. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).

94. 417 U.S. at 589. This exception is based on the need of police to act without a

warrant due to the mobility of automobiles. 267 U.S. at 153; see Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 49 (1970); Preston
v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Miles & Wefing, The Automobile Search and the
FourthAmendment, A Troubled Relationship, 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 105 (1972); Note,
supra note 58.
95. 417 U.S. at 589-91. The Court stated, "[tlhe search of an automobile is far less
intrusive on the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment than the search of one's
person or of a building." Id. at 590, quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266, 279 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). See note 71 supra.But see 53 N.C.L. REV.
722, 744-45 (1975) and cases cited therein.
96. See 53 N.C.L. REV. 722 (1975); Note, Confusing the Confusion: Automobile
Search and Seizure Takes a New Turn, 12 Hous. L. REV. 460 (1975).
97. See United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 866-67 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd en
banc by an equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (1976).
98. See id. The Government in Holmes did not contend that any exceptions to the
warrant requirement were applicable. Id. at 867 n.5.
99. Id. at 864-65.
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from visual surveillance. 100 The distinction between search and surveillance
is one of degree, requiring a balance between the individual's right of
privacy and legitimate governmental interests.' 0' The Ninth Circuit in
Hufford has taken the position that the use of an electronic tracking device
merely augments what can be observed by visual surveillance and is
10 2
therefore no greater an infringement upon the privacy of the individual.
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has held that while a citizen may anticipate
visual surveillance, "he can reasonably expect to be 'alone' in his car when
he enters it and drives away." 103
In practical effect, use of a beeper greatly surpasses visual surveillance
by continually broadcasting the location of the individual. 104 If a tracking
device is not required for this purpose, then law enforcement agents would
not need to rely upon a beeper to monitor a person's movements. Therefore,
it is submitted that if government officials require the use of electronic
surveillance devices, then a warrant should be required for their installation
subject only to those specifically defined exceptions to the warrant
requirement of the fourth amentment. 10 It is well-settled that "[t]he warrant
procedure is designed to guarantee that a decision to search private property
is justified by a reasonable governmental interest"'1 6 and to maintain the
procedure of antecedent justification which is central to the fourth
amendment. 0 7 Agents would still be able to place a beeper in contraband
100. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351; United States v. Hufford, 539
F.2d at 34; United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d at 866.

101. As stated by one commentator, "[a] line must be drawn between those
intrusions unreasonable in the absence of judicial or circumstantial justification, and
other fact-finding techniques which probe without entering the domain of fourth
amendment rights." Note, supra note 1, at 969 n.5. See Amsterdam, supra note 21, at
403.
102. 539 F.2d at 34.
103. 521 F.2d at 866 (footnote omitted).
104. As noted by the Fifth Circuit in Holmes, "[tihe beacon does convey
information as useful as any obtained from a wiretap ....
the beeper continually
broadcasts the statement, 'Here I am'." 521 F.2d at 865 n.12.
105. For a discussion of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, see note 58
supra. In United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67 (2nd Cir. 1973), the Second Circuit listed
the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement as: (1) hot pursuit; (2) plain view
doctrine; (3) emergency situation; (4) automobile search; (5) consent and (6) incident to
arrest. Id. at 76 (citations omitted).
In the area of electronic surveillance, the government's attempt to create a
new exception was rejected by the Supreme Court in Katz. 389 U.S. at 357-59. The
Court noted that due to the nature of electronic surveillance, the hot pursuit, consent
and incident to arrest exceptions would be inapplicable. Id. at 357-58. Moreover, the
Court stated that:
[a]lthough '[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the
course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the
lives of others,' there seems little likelihood that electronic surveillance would be a
realistic possibility in a situation so fraught with urgency.
Id. at 358 n.21, quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967). However, the
Eighth Circuit did find such an emergency situation to exist in one case to justify the
warrantless attachment of a beeper. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
106. Camera v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967)..
107. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967). See, e.g., Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (subsequent search cannot provide probable cause for prior
arrest); Stoll, Warrantless Searches: A Proposal to End a Dilemna, 8 AM. CRIM. L.Q.
20 (1969); Note, supra note 58, at 835-87.
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without a warrant since no one's reasonable expectation of privacy would be
thereby infringed;108 but when the government is undertaking an exploratory search for evidence, as in Holmes, a warrant should be required.
Policy considerations should also be weighed in resolving the conflict
between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. The fantastic advances in the field of
electronic surveillance raise great dangers to the privacy of the individual.' 09
If attachment of electronic beepers is held not to be a search, and hence not
within the protection of the fourth amendment, no significant restrictions on
the government in this area will exist.' 10 One commentator has warned, "It
is only 'searches' and 'seizures' that the fourth amendment requires to be
reasonable: police activity of any other sort may be as unreasonable as the
police please to make them."' 1 Moreover, if the warrantless installation of
tracking devices to one's vehicle or property is permitted, there are no
technological barriers to prevent government agents from attaching a
beeper to a person's clothing. One court noted that "[i]t offends common
sense to suggest that such a continuous electronic surveillance would not
violate any reasonable expectation of privacy.""' 2 The early admonition of
the Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States"3 is relevant to a determination
of the present inquiry: "It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest
and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get
their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight
' 4
deviations from legal modes of procedure." "1
If the position of the Holmes majority does not ultimately prevail, the
development of a mass monitoring system in which law enforcement agents,
not subject to fourth amendment restrictions, could indiscriminately place
beepers in a person's pocket to track his movements might not be thwarted.
It can be contended that a line of demarcation could be drawn between
attaching beepers on a person and installing them in a vehicle, but it is
submitted that under Katz, the individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in both situations." 5 This right of the citizen should not be
outweighed except by an independent magistrate's determination that
108. See United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887, 889-90 (1st Cir. 1976); United States
v. French, 414 F. Supp. 800, 803-04 (W. D. Okla. 1976).
109. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 384; Fried, supra note 1, at 475; Note,
Katz and the Fourth Amendment: A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy or, A Man's
Home is His Fort, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 63 (1974).
110. The Supreme Court in Katz confirmed the relevance of the fourth amendment
to the area electronic surveillance. 389 U.S. at 350-59. However, some commentators
have suggested that the first amendment may limit governmental intrusions in this
area. See, e.g., King, Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance: A Neglected Constitutional Consideration,66 DICK L. REV. 17, 24-38 (1961); Note, The Right of the People
to be Secure: The Developing Role of the Search Warrant, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1119, 1137
(1967).
111. Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 388 (footnote omitted). As noted by the Fifth
Circuit in Holmes, "[n]o safeguards would be imposed except by the self-restraint of
law enforcement officials." 521 F.2d at 866.
112. United States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334, 1339 (D. Mass. 1976).
113. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
114. Id. at 635.
115. See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d at 866; United States v. Bobisink,
415 F. Supp. at 1339 (D. Mass. 1976); Amsterdam, supra note 21; Knox, supra note 84.
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probable cause exists to justify the intrusion in the absence of exigent
116
circumstances.
Should this issue reach the Supreme Court, it is conceivable, however,
that the Ninth Circuit's position in Hufford"' may be upheld. If the Court
views the VIN and paint scraping cases as establishing a trend toward
permitting greater warrantless governmental intrusions, by labeling such
activity as not being a "search," 1' 8 the position of the Hufford court may be
interpreted as the next logical extension in this area. The Supreme Court
may also adopt a Cardwell mode of analysis" 9 and conclude that an
individual is entitled to a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle. 20
VI.

CONCLUSION

It appears likely that the current United States Supreme Court will
continue to curtail certain rights of criminal defendants which had been
expanded by the Warren Court.121 However, it is hoped that the longstanding rationale of Katz will continue as the determinative standard for
judging the scope of fourth amendment protection. Upon application of
these principles, the opinion of the Holmes majority should ultimately
prevail and require that the attachment of electronic tracking devices be
based upon antecedent justification by an independent magistrate in all
federal jurisdictions. If the installation of a beeper is not defined as
constituting a search, the Court's admonition in Katz, that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places,"' 122 will no longer have its present
significance.
Ira J. Rappeport

116. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357-59 (1967); United States v.
Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 866-67 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp.
1334, 1339 (D. Mass. 1976).

117. United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1976); see notes 67-71 and
accompanying text supra.
118. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
119. See notes 94 & 95 and accompanying text supra. See also note 53 supra.
120. See United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 865-67 (5th Cir. 1975).

121. See, e.g., Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.

433 (1974); Comment, Constitutional Law: Another Limitation on the Mandate of
Miranda v. Arizona and FurtherErosion of the Exclusionary Rule, 27 U. FLA. L. REV.
302 (1974). See also United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S.

188 (1973); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); Harris v. New York, 410 U.S. 222

(1971); Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the
Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L. J. 1198 (1971).
122. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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